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Improving Regulation Through Incremental
Adjustment
Robert L. Glicksman*
Sidney A. Shapiro**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Reform of environmental and other regulation has been a popular
topic for academics, think-tanks, and interested parties for the last two
decades. Claiming that existing regulation is excessive and irrational,
critics have successfully convinced Congress and the White House to
implement a plethora of procedural requirements to analyze a proposed
regulation before it is promulgated.1 In our recent book, Risk Regulation
at Risk,2 we argued that the previous initiatives address the possibility of
regulatory failure on the wrong end of the regulatory policy
implementation process. Current efforts to rationalize environmental and
other health and safety regulation at the “front end” of the regulatory
process are doomed to fail because of moral, methodological, and
informational limitations.3 We suggested that one way of improving
regulation would be to rely on incremental adjustments in regulation on
the “back end” of the regulatory process.4 One important advantage of
proceeding in this manner is that regulatory policy is adjusted in light of
its actual impact, as compared to the significant guesswork that is
required to use front-end analysis. In this manner, a back-end adjustment
process is consistent with the pragmatic approach to public policy that
we advocated in the book.5

* Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Member Scholar, Center for
Progressive Regulation. The authors thank the participants in the symposium of which this article is
a part for their useful contributions to this article.
** John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas (through Spring 2004); Member
Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation; University Distinguished Chair in Law, Wake Forest
University School of Law (Fall 2004–present).
1. See infra notes 12–23 and accompanying text.
2. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003).
3. Id. at 71–72.
4. Id. at 177; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The Missing Perspective,
ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 42.
5. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 177.
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This article addresses in more detail the potential of two types of
back-end processes: (1) deadline extensions and (2) waivers, exceptions,
and variances.6 Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Part II describes
the almost exclusive focus of regulatory reformers on the front end of the
process. Part III offers a close examination of five federal statutes that
provide opportunities for the two types of adjustments we are studying.
The results confirm our earlier assertion that Congress has authorized
agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Interior
Department to make these types of back-end adjustments available in a
variety of contexts and for a variety of reasons.7 Our analysis reveals
that Congress has established six different grounds for back-end
adjustment, and we assess the potential for each of these grounds to
improve regulatory policy. Although we recommend the imposition of
conditions on the issuance of some of these back-end adjustments, we
find that these adjustments are generally consistent with the
precautionary tilt of the statutes in which they are located because they
still require the regulated entity to do the best it can to protect people and
the environment. Where such protective mechanisms are absent, we urge
that the statutes be amended to include them.
Part IV analyzes the procedures by which requests for back-end
adjustments are currently processed. We find that agencies consider
most applications for back-end adjustments using informal procedures
that include public notice and solicitation of public comments, although
in a few instances, more formal procedures apply. We favor the informal
approach because it is an efficient way for agencies to respond to the
issues raised by requests for back-end adjustments and because more
elaborate procedures are not necessary to promote rational decisionmaking, given the nature of the issues likely to be raised in back-end
adjustment proceedings. We are concerned, however, about the extent to
which effective public participation will occur under these procedures.
We therefore endorse two steps to enhance the transparency of back-end
adjustment decision-making: the establishment of electronic reading
rooms and the issuance by agencies of annual reports on back-end

6. Other back-end adjustment mechanisms discussed in our book are the subjects of other
articles in this symposium. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is
Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. ___ (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive
Management Seriously: A Case Study for the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. ___
(2004).
7. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 158–59.
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adjustments.8 We argue that these two mechanisms will facilitate
involvement by public interest groups and interested citizens by allowing
them to prioritize the adjustment proceedings in which they wish to
become involved.
The result is likely to be enhanced agency
accountability and reduced opportunities for agency abuse of the backend adjustment process.
II. THE FRONT-END EFFORT TO RATIONALIZE REGULATION
Critics of environmental and other risk regulation have engaged in a
long-standing and vigorous effort to criticize regulatory policy as
irrational and excessive.9 We and others have attempted to demonstrate
that most of these criticisms are wide of the mark.10 Nevertheless, these
complaints have become the foundation on which the White House and
Congress have built an extensive apparatus of front-end analysis of
proposed and final regulations.
Since the Reagan Administration, there has been a series of
executive orders that establish analytical reporting requirements
monitored by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).11 President Reagan
issued Executive Order 12,291,12 which required executive agencies to
assess the benefits and costs of proposed rules, followed by executive
orders requiring assessment of family, federalism, and property
impacts.13 In the first Bush Administration, the White House required
8

We discuss these proposals further in Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L.

Glicksman, The APA and the Back-End of Regulation: Procedures for Informal
Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1159 (2004).
9. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993); RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM
REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
10. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2,
at 73–91; Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2004).
11. Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in
Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 708 (2000).
12. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 635
(2000) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866).
13. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 636–
37 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 636
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executive agencies to perform a preliminary cost-benefit analysis to
justify placement of a proposed regulation on an agency’s regulatory
agenda,14 and it extended Executive Order 12,291 to almost every form
of agency action except adjudication.15 The Clinton Administration
issued its own executive order requiring agencies to assess the costs and
benefits of proposed and final rules, and it established a review process
similar to the ones used by previous administrations.16 President George
W. Bush has continued the Clinton executive order.17
Congress has also been busy creating front-end requirements. In
1980, it passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires a
regulatory flexibility analysis whenever an agency proposes a rule that
may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
businesses, organizations, or governments.18 In 1995, Congress passed
the Regulatory Accountability and Reform Act, which requires agencies
to prepare a regulatory impact assessment before they promulgate a
proposed or final regulation that includes a “mandate” resulting in costs
over $100 million annually on state, local, or tribal governments or the
private sector.19 In 2001, Congress passed the Information Quality Act,20
which requires agencies to establish procedures to ensure the
“objectivity, utility, and integrity” of information “disseminated” by the
federal government, and which gave OMB oversight authority over
agency compliance with the guidelines.21 In February 2002, OMB issued

(2000); Exec. Order No. 12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 606
(2000).
14. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994).
15. Id.
16. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 638–
42 (2000).
17. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff,
the White House, to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Regulatory Review Plan (Jan. 20, 2001) (adopting the meaning of “regulation” set forth in Exec.
Order No. 12,866), available at 66 Fed. Reg. 7702, also available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regreview_plan.pdf; see also Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3
C.F.R. 204 (2002) (amending Exec. Order No. 12,866).
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2000).
19. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2000). In 1996, Congress amended the Regulatory Flexibility Act to
establish judicial review of agency compliance with some of its requirements. See Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 242, 110 Stat. 857, 865–66
(1996) (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2000)).
20. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-154 (2001).
21. Id. §§ 515(a), (b)(1).
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guidelines that instructed agencies how to comply with the legislation.22
The guidelines established new analytical requirements regarding the
dissemination of information, including the dissemination of information
as part of the rulemaking process.23
All of these initiatives are part of what Debra Stone calls the
“rationality project,”24 which is an effort to rationalize regulation on the
basis of “rational choice theory, microeconomic efficiency models, and
cost-benefit analysis.”25 There are three difficulties with this effort.
First, analysts are subject to “bounded rationality.”26 We simply lack the
information necessary to make accurate judgments using these
techniques.27 Thus, “[a]t its best, cost-benefit analysis usually offers
only a rough approximation of the actual costs and benefits of regulatory
action—too rough for decision-making.”28
Second, the multiple
demands imposed by these analytical requirements have ossified the
rulemaking process, slowing the promulgation of regulations to a crawl.29
Finally, the use of cost-benefit analysis and other similar techniques
invites analysts to implement normative values that are at odds with the
statutes that EPA and other risk agencies implement. Whereas costbenefit analysis seeks only the most economically efficient level of
regulation, risk statutes almost universally implement a different and
broader moral perspective.30 In these statutes, Congress has expressly
rejected the idea that economic efficiency is the only value to determine
regulatory policy.
Instead, it made protecting people and the
22. Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg.
8452 (Feb. 22, 2002).
23. Sidney A. Shapiro, Information Data Quality and Environmental Protection: The Perils of
Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 346–49 (2004).
Under the authority of the IQA,, OMB also issued a bulletin requiring extensive use of peer review
prior to the dissemination of information, including information used in the rulemaking process.
Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,664 (Jan. 14, 2005); see Sidney
A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,064, 10,0064–65
(2004).
24. Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 11, at 706 (citing Debra A. Stone, Clinical
Authority in the Construction of Citizenship, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR DEMOCRACY 45, 46 (Helen
Ingram & Stephen Rathgeb Smith eds., 1993)).
25. Id.
26. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 22–24.
27. Id. at 65.
28. Shapiro & Glicksman, The Missing Perspective, supra note 4, at 50.
29. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 134–36; see Thomas O. McGarity, Some
Thoughts On “Deossifying” The Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1389–90 (1992)
(documenting the slowdown in rulemaking).
30. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 32.
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environment a priority by requiring risk producers to use their “best
efforts” to reduce risks.31 Unlike cost-benefit analysis, this commitment
recognizes and honors the intrinsic value of protecting humans and the
environment while still taking costs into consideration.32
Readers seeking a more elaborate defense of these propositions will
need to look at our book and similar efforts by other scholars.33 For
purposes of this article, we assume that the problems of rationalizing
policy at the front end of the process require us to look elsewhere for
ways to fine-tune regulation. In our book, among other suggestions, we
proposed that back-end adjustments have considerable promise.34 Our
principal argument was that such adjustments occur in light of real world
experience, which gives regulators concrete information about the impact
of a regulation.35 Nevertheless, we also observed that there were certain
potential difficulties with this approach, including the potential that
regulators could gut a regulation by handing out undeserved exemptions
and exceptions.36 We therefore urged that it was essential that agencies
be accountable for the back-end adjustments that they make.37
While the front-end effort to rationalize regulation has received most
of the attention, less attention has been paid to the regime of back-end
adjustments that Congress has authorized. This article seeks to
understand better the manner in which Congress has structured existing
back-end adjustments and the extent to which agency decision-makers
responsible for considering requests for back-end adjustments are
accountable for their decisions.
III. THE BACK-END EFFORT TO RATIONALIZE REGULATION
This section considers the degree of regulatory rationality of
presently-structured back-end adjustments. We first describe the
potential regulatory advantages of back-end adjustments. We then
survey the back-end provisions of five federal health, safety, and
environmental statutes that provide opportunities for back-end
adjustments. Our goal is to determine the conditions under which backend adjustments are currently made and to assess whether these

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 51–54.
See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 10.
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 158–76.
Id. at 170–72.
Id. at 172–74.
Id. at 174–76.
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provisions are likely to produce the regulatory advantages that we have
identified.
A. Potential Advantages
A back-end adjustment process has a number of policy advantages.
First, it permits agencies to preserve relatively stringent baseline riskreduction standards while still accommodating concerns that the
application of these stringent rules will cause irrational or unfair results
in particular cases.38 As one court has explained, “a regulatory system
which allows flexibility, and a lessening of firm proscriptions in a proper
case, can lend strength to the system as a whole.”39 Regulators can make
case-by-case adjustments instead of initially watering down standards in
anticipation that a general rule may be counterproductive or irrational in
some circumstances.40
Second, a back-end process addresses the ossification of the
rulemaking process and the problem of bounded rationality in several
ways. Agencies issue back-end adjustments after a rule has been
adopted. The availability of these adjustments can avoid delay in the
issuance of a rule of widespread applicability because an agency can
promulgate a rule and rely on regulated entities to alert it to
implementation problems by filing individual requests for relief.41 A
back-end process therefore serves as a check on the rationality of rules
that are promulgated. If an agency receives a significant number of
meritorious applications, it may suggest that a regulation is flawed and
requires adjustment.42 Further, a back-end process gives regulated
entities a strong incentive to produce evidence that an adjustment in a
rule is justified. Since these firms are the most likely entities to possess
information bearing on the unique aspects of their situation that justify an
adjustment, this process addresses the problem of bounded rationality.43
Moreover, because incremental adjustments limit the scope of factual
38. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 197 (1999) (“The existence of an escape valve might
even strengthen support for the environmental baseline by making it clear that later
adjustments would be available.”).
39. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
40. See Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of Regulations at the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 255, 277 (1995) (noting that administrative equity
“eschews the ability of rules to provide universal justice”).
41. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 170–71.
42. Id. at 172.
43. Id. at 171.
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inquiry, they demand fewer analytical resources and take less time than
addressing the same problems in rulemaking,44 which frees up agency
resources for implementing the agency’s statutory mission. Unlike
rulemaking, in which regulators must attempt to anticipate problems
before they occur in the context of writing general rules, incremental
adjustments permit regulators to consider concrete problems, one at a
time, in the context of specific circumstances. The back-end process can
also make adjustments to circumstances that cannot be anticipated at the
time a rule was written.45 A back-end adjustment process can also
reduce the number of challenges to regulations and the need to use
enforcement proceedings to interpret rules and make policy.46
Third, a back-end adjustment process can increase the legitimacy of
the regulatory program that contains the back-end process by reducing
the frustrations likely to result from the application of regulatory
requirements in ways that produce harsh or anomalous results. Thus,
Judge Harold Leventhal argued in another regulatory context prior to the
adoption of any of the laws analyzed in this article that:
[A] rule is more likely to be undercut if it does not in some way take
into account considerations of hardship, equity, or more effective
implementation of overall policy, considerations that an agency cannot
realistically ignore, at least on a continuing basis. The limited safety
valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective regulation.47

Finally, but hardly least of all, a back-end process is one of the ways
that regulators can take costs into account when Congress eschews the
use of a cost-benefit test to establish the level of regulation. As we
explain in our book, Congress has rejected the use of a cost-benefit
analysis to establish the level of risk reduction in almost every health,
safety, and environmental statute.48 Instead, Congress typically requires
agencies to take costs into account in one of two ways. In open-ended
44. Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the
Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 196.
45. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 430 (1981) (noting how an incremental process accommodates the “tide of technical and social
change”); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 537 F.2d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating
that absent the availability of variances, “there is no guarantee that [a regulatory defect that arose
because regulations were ill-suited to individual plants] could be effectively remedied if it
occurred”).
46. Schuck, supra note 44, at 283 (“By reducing the hardships and the sense of injustice
suffered by those to whom a rule applies, exceptions diminish the pressure to challenge the rule
itself.”).
47. WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 44.
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balancing, agencies consider compliance costs as one of the factors to be
considered in establishing the level of regulation, but there is no
obligation to balance costs and benefits.49 In constrained balancing, an
agency chooses the level of protection by identifying and patterning
regulatory objectives upon some model technology.50 In this manner,
Congress limits the authority of agencies to impose abatement costs
according to the availability of the technology.51 Our book contends that
there are important moral and practical reasons for using these regulatory
approaches instead of a cost-benefit test.52 Because a back-end
adjustment process that authorizes hardship-based adjustments offers
another way to take costs into consideration without relying on a costbenefit test, it supports the rationality of the current regulatory
approaches.53
B. Current Provisions
This section analyzes whether current back-end provisions are likely
to produce the policy advantages that we have identified. To make this
determination, we surveyed five federal health, safety, and
environmental statutes that provide opportunities for back-end
adjustments: the Clean Water Act (CWA),54 the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA),55 the Clean Air Act (CAA),56 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),57 and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).58
Our survey finds that Congress has provided for back-end
adjustments in the form of deadline extensions and waivers, variances,
and exceptions in all five statutes under consideration. A table
summarizing these findings can be found in Appendix I. A deadline
extension, as its name implies, is an adjustment of the date by which a
regulated entity must comply with its regulatory obligations. A waiver,
exception, or variance provides relief for a regulated entity from
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 46–72.
We discuss hardship-based adjustments infra Part III.B.2.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939e (2000).
Id. §§ 7401–7671q.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
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regulatory obligations otherwise applicable to it by affording it treatment
that differs from the treatment afforded other entities subject to the same
obligations. A variance or exception may subject the entity applying for
the back-end adjustment to more lenient pollution controls, for example.
A waiver or exemption may even exempt an entity altogether from the
need to comply.59 Congress has made these back-end adjustments
available under the statutes we have reviewed on at least six different
policy grounds.60 Congress permits back-end adjustments on the basis of
lack of adverse impact on the environment, hardship or technological
unavailability, the desire to provide incentives to develop new pollution
control or risk-reducing technology, fairness, conflicts between
environmental and other social policy values, and, in at least one
instance, in open-ended situations.61
We conclude that most, although not all, of these provisions provide
policy adjustments that should improve regulatory rationality. Our
analysis is organized according to the five policy grounds on which the
various types of adjustments are available.
1. Harm-Based Adjustments

59. It is theoretically possible for an agency to subject a regulated entity to more stringent
regulatory requirements by issuing a variance at the behest of an environmental public interest
group. EPA’s CWA regulations, for example, explain that it may be necessary to adjust the
regulatory effluent limitation regulations on a case-by-case basis to “make them either more or less
stringent as they apply to certain dischargers within an industrial category or subcategory” to take
account of data that EPA never considered in issuing the regulations and that render a particular
discharger’s situation fundamentally different from the ones EPA considered in the rulemaking. 40
C.F.R. § 125.30(b) (2003); see also id. § 125.31(c) (setting forth the criteria for issuance of
alternative effluent limitations that are “more stringent than required by national limits”). In
practice, however, back-end adjustments more commonly take the form of more lenient (as opposed
to more stringent) treatment.
60. Agency regulations may create additional opportunities for back-end adjustments, such as
situations in which new information becomes available. See, e.g., id. § 233.36(a)(5) (authorizing the
modification of dredge and fill permits issued under § 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, on the
basis of significant new information that would have justified the imposition of different permit
conditions had it been available at the time of issuance). Cf. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5) (2003)
(authorizing limited adjustments to incidental take permits under the ESA in the event of changed or
unforeseen circumstances).
61. The agencies sometimes make back-end adjustments available even if Congress has not
specifically authorized them. The Supreme Court endorsed EPA’s creation of fundamentally
different factor (FDF) variances from the CWA’s effluent limitations for point sources in E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126–36 (1977). See also EPA v. Nat’l Crushed
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 73–85 (1980) (considering the appropriate grounds for issuance of an FDF
variance). More recently, the Second Circuit upheld EPA’s authority to issue variances from CWA
regulatory requirements on new cooling water intake structures. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d
174, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Harm-based adjustments provide relief to a regulated entity from
regulatory obligations that would otherwise apply to it in a situation in
which the regulated activity does not create the types of risks to health,
safety, or the environment that the regulatory program was designed to
minimize. In such a situation, requiring compliance with the applicable
obligations could be regarded as “treatment for treatment’s sake” in that
the harm that the statute seeks to avoid will not occur even in the absence
of compliance.62
a. Availability
All five statutes contain examples of harm-based adjustments. Our
survey found the following examples of such adjustments.
CWA. The CWA is illustrative of the availability of harm-based
back-end adjustments under the federal environmental laws. The statute
authorizes EPA, with the concurrence of the state, to “modify” the
second phase of the technology-based effluent limitations for point
sources discharging certain kinds of nonconventional pollutants upon a
showing that the modification (i.e., the more lenient treatment sought)
will not interfere with the maintenance or attainment of water quality that
assures protection of public water supplies, assures protection and
propagation of a balanced population of fish and wildlife, and allows
recreational activities in and on the water.63 In addition, the applicant
must show that the modification will not result in discharges “which may
reasonably be anticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to human health
or the environment because of bioaccumulation, persistency in the
environment, acute [or] chronic toxicity . . . , or synergistic
propensities.”64 In other words, if a point source is able to show that
62. Industry has long criticized uniform pollution controls such as the CWA’s technologybased effluent limitations as imposing “treatment for treatment’s sake” in that the treatment required
by the regulation is unnecessary to protect the resource in question. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler,
Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing Alternative Futures, 25 ENVIRONS L. & POL’Y J. 77, 89
(2002); William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State,
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 193 (2003); Oliver A. Houck, Of
Bats, Birds, and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 417
(1994); Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1876, 1886 (2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999)).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(2)(c) (2000).
64. Id. This water quality-based modification only goes so far. The statute bars EPA from
issuing a modification that excuses compliance with the first phase of the technology-based effluent
limitations. Id. § 1311(g)(2)(A). In addition, a modification may not be issued if it will result in
additional requirements on other, presumably downstream, point or nonpoint sources. Id. §
1311(g)(2)(B).
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compliance with effluent limitations less stringent than the technologybased limitations that apply to other point sources in the same industry
will not adversely affect the water quality goals of the statute, it may be
eligible for individualized regulatory relief. The statute authorizes
modifications based on similar grounds for publicly-owned treatment
works discharging into marine waters.65
Similarly, the CWA authorizes EPA or a state administering the
permit program for point sources to impose an alternative effluent
limitation if it can show that any effluent limitation for the control of the
thermal component of any discharge will require controls more stringent
than necessary to assure the protection and propagation of shellfish, fish,
and wildlife in the receiving water. The alternative limitation must
assure the same degree of protection and propagation.66
RCRA. RCRA contains a plethora of mechanisms for individualized
adjustments based on the lack of potential for the regulated activity to
cause environmental harm. RCRA requires EPA to compile a list of
hazardous wastes based on listing criteria that include factors such as
toxicity, persistence, . . . degradability in nature, [and] potential for
accumulation in tissue.”67
Entities engaged in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of listed wastes are subject
to a variety of regulatory standards issued by EPA.68 An individual
facility may petition EPA to exclude a waste generated at that facility
from listing.69 Although the statute does not explicitly provide the
grounds for the granting of a delisting petition, EPA regulations require
that the petitioner demonstrate that the waste produced at the petitioner’s
facility does not meet any of the criteria under which the waste was listed
as hazardous.70 The CAA contains a similar petition process for the
delisting of pollutants that Congress or EPA has designated as hazardous
air pollutants.71
RCRA prohibits the land disposal of certain hazardous wastes unless
EPA determines that the prohibition is not required to protect “human
health and the environment for as long as the waste remains
65. Id. § 1311(h)(2).
66. Id. § 1326(a). For a discussion of § 316 thermal discharge variances, see generally 2
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 574–77 (1986).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(a), (b)(1) (2000).
68. Id. §§ 6922–6924.
69. Id. § 6921(f)(1).
70. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22(a)(1) (2003). EPA regulations also provide a mechanism for the filing
of petitions to add a hazardous waste to the list. Id. § 260.23. That mechanism is available to
environmental public interest groups.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3). Petitions also may be filed under this provision to add substances
to the list.
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hazardous.”72 The statute further provides that a method of land disposal
may not be deemed protective of human health and the environment
unless, “upon application by an interested person, it has been
demonstrated to [EPA], to a reasonable degree of certainty, that there
will be no migration of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or
injection zone for as long as the wastes remain hazardous.”73 RCRA
therefore creates a back-end adjustment mechanism to the land disposal
prohibition. If a regulated entity can convince EPA that a particular form
of land disposal of a particular listed hazardous waste will not allow the
waste to migrate in such a way as to threaten human health or the
environment, EPA is authorized to lift the prohibition on land disposal.
EPA also has the authority to exempt from groundwater monitoring
requirements any structure which EPA finds does not receive or contain
liquid waste, is designed to operate to exclude liquid from precipitation
or other runoff, uses multiple leak detection systems, and provides for
continuing operation and maintenance of these leak detection systems
during operation, closure, and post-closure.74 EPA may issue the
exemption only if it concludes that, as a result of these conditions, there
is a reasonable certainty that hazardous constituents will not migrate
beyond the outer layer of containment before the end of the required
post-closure monitoring period.75 This exemption is another example of
a back-end adjustment that becomes available if EPA determines that the
health and environmental risks that the regulatory program was designed
to avoid do not exist in a particular situation.76
Still another harm-based adjustment provision in RCRA relates to
the use of hazardous waste as fuel. RCRA requires that EPA issue
regulatory standards applicable to facilities that produce a fuel from any
listed hazardous waste and to facilities that burn any such fuel for
purposes of energy recovery as may be necessary to protect human
health and the environment.77 EPA may exempt from these standards
(and from related labeling and recordkeeping requirements) any facility
72. The statute only actually bans the land disposal of hazardous waste that is not treated in
conformity with treatment standards issued by EPA. Id. §§ 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5).
73. Id. §§ 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5).
74. Id. § 6924(p).
75. Id.
76. See also id. § 6925(j)(4) (authorizing EPA to modify a statutory prohibition on the receipt,
storage, or treatment of hazardous waste in surface impoundments not in compliance with statutory
minimum technological requirements if the owner or operator of such an impoundment demonstrates
that the impoundment is located, designed, and operated such that no hazardous constituent will
migrate into groundwater or surface water).
77. Id. § 6924(q)(1).
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which burns de minimis quantities of hazardous waste as fuel, provided
EPA determines the incendiary device sufficiently destroys and removes
waste so as to ensure protection of human health and the environment.78
Under such circumstances, presumably, compliance with the regulatory
standards is not necessary to avoid risks of health or environmental harm.
CAA. The CAA also contains adjustment provisions designed to
eliminate regulatory restrictions that EPA deems unnecessary to achieve
air quality objectives or that may even impair the pursuit of clean air.79
The 1990 amendments to the statute required all states that had not yet
achieved the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for carbon
monoxide to revise their implementation plans (known as state
implementation plans, or SIPs) to require sale of oxygenated gasoline
during the period of the year during which the “area is prone to high
ambient concentrations of carbon monoxide.”80 EPA has the power to
waive the application of this requirement if a state demonstrates that the
use of oxygenated gasoline would interfere with the attainment of an
NAAQS for an air pollutant other than carbon monoxide.81 EPA also
may waive the requirement that oxygenated gasoline be sold if it
determines that mobile sources of carbon monoxide do not contribute
significantly to carbon monoxide levels in a particular area.82
OSH Act. Harm-based, back-end adjustments are not limited to the
federal pollution control laws. The Secretary of Labor may issue such
adjustments under the OSH Act, too. The OSH Act permits any affected
employer to apply to the Secretary for a variance from an occupational
safety and health standard.83 The Secretary must grant the application if
he or she finds that the employer
has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes used or
proposed to be used by an employer will provide employment and
78. Id. § 6924(q)(2)(B).
79. The CAA, for example, authorizes EPA to make adjustments to regulatory obligations for
sources contained within geographic areas based on the absence of a risk to health or the
environment from regulated sources in that area. Thus, the statute affords EPA the discretion to
waive any requirement imposed on certain areas that are not in compliance with the NAAQS for
particulate matter if it determines that anthropogenic sources of PM-10 do not significantly
contribute to the violation of the PM-10 standard in that area. Id. § 7513(f).
80. Id. § 7545(m)(2).
81. Id. § 7545(m)(3)(A).
82. Id. § 7545(m)(3)(B). EPA also may delay the effective date of the oxygenated fuels
requirement if it finds that there is or is likely to be an inadequate domestic supply of or distribution
capacity for oxygenated gasoline in the area. Id. § 7545(m)(3)(C). This provision is a form of
hardship-based adjustment based on technological inadequacy.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (2000).
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places of employment to his employees which are as safe and healthful
as those which would prevail if he complied with the standard.84

The variance must prescribe the conditions the employer must maintain
and the practices it must adopt to the extent they differ from the standard
from which the variance is sought.85
ESA. Finally, the ESA also provides for harm-based adjustments.
The statute authorizes any interested person to file a petition to add a
species to or remove a species from the lists maintained by the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) of endangered and threatened species.86 The
FWS must issue a finding as to whether the petition presents substantial
scientific or commercial information indicating that the petitioned action
may be warranted.87 If so, the FWS must commence a review of the
status of the species concerned.88 If the FWS decides to grant a delisting
petition, it essentially concludes that the harm or risk to species that the
ESA is meant to avoid89 does not exist. Similarly, the ESA authorizes
interested persons to file petitions to revise critical habitat designations
previously made by the FWS.90
In certain instances, back-end adjustments may be available not
because the affected activity lacks the potential to harm the resource or
value that the statute seeks to protect, but instead because the application
of the regulation from which relief is sought has the potential to harm
other resources or values. EPA has authorized the issuance of variances
under the CWA, for example, to point sources able to demonstrate that
regulatory compliance “would result in significant adverse impacts on
local air quality . . . or significant adverse impacts on local energy
markets.”91 Such an adjustment also qualifies as a harm-based
adjustment, although the basis for the adjustment is the desire to avoid
adverse cross-media impacts rather than to avoid treatment for
treatment’s sake.
b. Evaluation
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2000).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The ESA is designed in part “to provide a program for the conservation of . . . endangered
species and threatened species.” Id. § 1531(b).
90. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(D)(i).
91. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 40 C.F.R. §
125.85(a)(2)).
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A regulated entity is entitled to a harm-based adjustment if it can
establish that the adjustment would not lead to decreased protection for
people or the environment. When this situation exists, Congress has
authorized the agency either to reduce92 or waive93 the regulatory
requirement.
Harm-based adjustments, such as these provisions, rationalize
regulation because they take into account situations in which the
regulated entity does not present any danger to the public or the
environment or presents less danger than other regulated entities.
Assuming that there is an accurate agency determination regarding the
risk issue so that the levels of protection chosen by Congress are not
jeopardized through individualized adjustments, this category of backend adjustments would appear to promote the advantages identified
earlier. Regulators can eliminate unnecessary costs, but this is done at
the back-end instead of during rulemaking. Moreover, regulated entities
do not have to sue the agency and contest the rulemaking in order to get
regulatory relief. Presumably, the administrative adjustment process will
be less onerous than a judicial challenge would be in many cases.
2. Hardship-Based Adjustments
The harm-based adjustments discussed above recognize that some
regulated entities may not be endangering the public or the environment
in the manner anticipated by a regulation. Hardship adjustments, by
comparison, are based on the adverse economic impact of regulation on
an individual firm or on the absence of available technology to comply
with regulatory standards. The rationale for hardship-based adjustments
is as follows:
Though Congress may have decided that industries should internalize
certain environmental costs, . . . Congress’s broad legislative objectives
do not automatically outweigh the continued survival of regulated
firms. The regulatory cures for environmental pollution . . . should not
necessarily cripple the industries to which they apply. Stability and
preservation of economic order go hand in hand with environmental or
economic reforms. The regulatory preference for individual firm
survival does not necessarily mean that shutdowns must always be
92. See supra notes 64–66 (discussing the CWA), 883–85 (discussing the OSH Act).
93. See supra notes 69–78 (discussing RCRA), 79–91 (discussing the CAA) and 85–90
(discussing the ESA).

2004]

IMPROVING REGULATION

17

avoided, but such extreme consequences should be the result of a
considered process, not the unintended or unconscious fallout of an
overbroad statute or rule.94

a. Availability
All five statutes also provide for incremental adjustments on the
basis of hardship. Our survey found the following examples of such
adjustments.
CWA. The CWA authorizes EPA to establish technology-based
effluent limitations as the principal device for achieving95 the statute’s
fishable/swimmable waters goal.96 To avoid the statutory prohibition on
discharges into navigable waters,97 point sources of surface water
pollution must comply with a phased series of effluent limitations, which
are incorporated into individual permits issued either by EPA or an
authorized state. The statute authorizes EPA, however, to “modify”98 the
requirements of the second phase of the effluent limitations “upon a
showing by the owner or operator of such point source . . . that such
modified requirements (1) will represent the maximum use of technology
within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and (2) will
result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the
discharge of pollutants.”99 Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained,
“the economic ability of the individual operator to meet the costs of
effluent reductions may in some circumstances justify granting a
variance from the [phase two, technology-based] limitations.”100 This
kind of hardship-based adjustment “creates for a particular point source a
[technology-based] standard that represents for it the same sort of
economic and technological commitment as the general . . . standard
creates for the class.”101
94. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative
Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 302–03.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000).
96. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
97. Id. § 1311(a).
98. The Supreme Court has referred to these modifications as variances. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 136 (1977).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
These modifications apply to point sources discharging
nonconventional pollutants. See id. § 1311(l) (barring EPA from issuing a modification with respect
to listed toxic pollutants).
100. EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 (1980).
101. Id. at 74. In addition to demonstrating economic hardship, the applicant must show that it
will make “reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.” 33
U.S.C. § 1311(c). Accordingly, the economic hardship that compliance with regulatory standards
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Further, EPA regulations authorize variances from the category-wide
effluent limitation regulations on a different basis that relates to the
economic impact of regulation on a particular discharger.
The
regulations make variances available to dischargers able to demonstrate
that compliance with the national limits would result in the imposition of
a removal cost that is “wholly out of proportion to the removal cost
considered during development of the national limits.”102
RCRA. RCRA contains an adjustment mechanism based on the
unavailability of pollution control technology. RCRA subjects those
involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste to the
most rigorous regulatory treatment. When Congress amended the statute
in 1984, it adopted a series of bans on the land disposal103 of certain
kinds of hazardous waste, including wastes containing free cyanides or
heavy metals, solvents, or dioxins.104 RCRA authorizes EPA to defer the
effective date of one or more of the land disposal prohibitions based on
the unavailability of adequate alternative treatment, recovery, or disposal
capacity, provided it protects human health and the environment.105 If
EPA grants a deadline extension (which the statute calls a variance),
hazardous waste may be disposed in a landfill or surface impoundment
for the duration of the extension period, provided the facility at which the
for a class of point sources would cause for an individual point source is allowed to undercut the
statutory goal of reducing water pollution only up to a point.
The CWA also provided relief to publicly owned treatment works on hardship grounds. The
statute allowed the owners or operators of such works to request that EPA or an authorized state
extend the time for compliance with the technology-based controls applicable to publicly owned
treatment works (called secondary treatment). Id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B), 1314(d). To be eligible for
such an extension, the applicant had to show that construction was required for the treatment works
to achieve secondary treatment but that the United States had failed to make financial assistance
available to the treatment works in time for it to achieve the discharge limitations based on
secondary treatment. Id. § 1311(i). Requests by municipalities for an extension under this provision
had to be filed within 180 days of February 4, 1987.
102. 40 C.F.R. § 125.31(b)(3)(i) (2003). This provision is part of the FDF variance mechanism
discussed more fully below in connection with fairness-based adjustments. In EPA v. National
Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980), the Court held that, even though FDF variances were
available from the phase one, technology-based effluent limitations for point sources, FDF variances
were not available on the ground that a particular discharger could not afford to comply with the
national limits. Id. at 74–78. See also Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.85(a)(2) and stating that a variance may be available from cooling water
intake structure regulations based on “compliance costs wholly out of proportion to the costs EPA
considered in establishing the requirement” for which the variance is sought).
103. For purposes of this prohibition, “land disposal” includes “placement of such hazardous
waste in a landfill, surface impoundment, waste pile, injection well, land treatment facility, salt
dome formation, salt bed formation, or underground mine or cave.” 42 U.S.C. § 6924(k) (2000).
104. Id. § 6924(d)–(e). The 1984 amendments also banned the disposal of these wastes into
deep injection wells, id. § 6924(f), and required EPA to determine whether to ban the land disposal
of other listed hazardous wastes pursuant to a statutory timetable, id. § 6924(g)(4)–(5).
105. Id. § 6924(h)(2).
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disposal occurs complies with minimum technological requirements
(such as installation of liners and leachate collection systems and the
performance of groundwater monitoring) set forth in the statute.106
CAA. The CAA also envisions the issuance of back-end adjustments
based on economic hardship or technological infeasibility.107 For the
most part, those adjustments are issued by the states, not by EPA.108
EPA is responsible under the CAA for issuing NAAQS that are requisite
to protect the public health and welfare.109 The statute delegates to the
states the authority to devise SIPs to achieve the NAAQS.110 States still
have considerable discretion to determine the manner in which they will
control emissions of air pollutants, provided the mix of controls the state
devises is sufficient to achieve the NAAQS,111 even though that
discretion was reduced by both the 1977 and 1990 amendments.112
States may accommodate concerns that pollution control requirements
will adversely affect the economic viability of a regulated source in the
implementation plan itself.113 Alternatively, a regulated air pollution
source may apply to the state agency that administers the plan for a
variance from the plan, and such a variance may be based on claims of
106. Id. § 6924(h)(4).
107. In addition to the individualized adjustment mechanisms described below, the CAA
provides for certain “global adjustments” on feasibility grounds as well. For example, the statute
authorizes EPA, upon application by a state, to extend the attainment date for compliance with the
national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter if the state demonstrates that compliance
with the statutory deadline “would be impracticable” and that the state has already required the most
stringent control measures that can be feasibly implemented in the area. Id. § 7513(e).
108. But see 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.560–80.561 (allowing EPA to grant hardship-based relief from
requirements of diesel sulfur control program).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).
110. Id. § 7410(a); see also id. § 7407(a) (declaring that each state has the “primary
responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State by
submitting an implementation plan for such State which will specify the manner in which national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained . . . in such
State”).
111. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 267 (1976) (“the State has virtually absolute
power in allocating emission limitations so long as the national standards are met”); Train v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (“so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of
emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty
to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation”).
112. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 329
(4th ed. 2003) (discussing the effect of the 1990 amendments).
113. See Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 266. The Court states:
Perhaps the most important forum for consideration of claims of economic and
technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan.
So long as the national standards are met, the State may select whatever mix of control
devices it desires, and industries with particular economic or technological problems may
seek special treatment in the plan itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
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economic hardship or technological feasibility. The Supreme Court has
stated that, while nothing in the CAA requires the states to grant
variances based on claims of economic or technological infeasibility, the
statute delegates the authority to the states to make adjustments to the
SIP on these grounds.114 After the 1990 amendments to the CAA, the
states have the authority to accommodate concerns based on economic
hardship through the issuance of individual permits.115
The CAA also authorizes EPA and the states to adjust the obligations
of a particular class of air pollution sources, primary nonferrous smelters,
based on technological unavailability. Either EPA or a state may issue a
primary nonferrous smelter order, which becomes part of the state
implementation plan, if an individual smelter is unable to meet the
implementation plan’s deadline for compliance with a sulfur oxide
emission standard because no means of emission limitation has been
adequately determined to be reasonably available.116 The recipient of
such an order must comply with whatever interim measures EPA
determines are necessary to assure attainment and maintenance of the
NAAQS, taking into account all variances, extensions, waivers, and
primary nonferrous smelter orders previously issued under the CAA.117
EPA also may establish alternative, less stringent emission limitations for
coal-fired utilities subject to the nitrogen oxides emission reduction
program created in 1990 as part of the acid deposition control program if
the utility can show that it cannot meet the applicable limitation using the
technology on which EPA based the limitation.118
Finally, the CAA provides for adjustments to avoid economic
hardship upon the initiative of a state governor, rather than at the behest
of individual regulated entities. The governor may submit to EPA a
proposed revision to the state’s implementation plan that meets CAA
requirements and that is necessary to prevent the closing of any source of
air pollution and substantial increases in unemployment that would result
from such a closing.119 If EPA has neither approved nor disapproved the
114. Id. at 267 n.16 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.2(b), (d) (1975)); see also Train, 421 U.S. at 69 n.6
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 88-912 (1971)) (allowing issuance of variances based on “special
circumstances which would render strict compliance unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or
impractical . . . or because strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment or closing down
of one or more businesses, plants or operations”). The electric utility that brought suit in Union
Electric apparently received a variance on economic hardship grounds. 427 U.S. at 252.
115. The permit program created by the 1990 amendments is governed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–
7661f (2000).
116. Id. § 7419(b)(3).
117. Id. § 7419(d)(1)(A).
118. Id. § 7651f(d)(2).
119. Id. § 7410(g)(1).
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proposal within twelve months of submission, the governor may issue a
temporary emergency suspension of the part of the implementation plan
subject to the proposed revision.120 If the governor finds that the source
is unable to comply solely because of the conditions upon which the
suspension was based, the suspension order may include a provision
delaying any compliance order or increment of progress to which a
pollution source is subject.121
The OSH Act.
Congress has provided for hardship-based
adjustments from workplace health and safety standards as well as from
the federal pollution control laws. The OSH Act authorizes any
employer to apply to the Secretary of Labor for a temporary order
granting a variance from an occupational safety and health standard
promulgated by OSHA.122 To qualify for a variance, the employer must
establish that it is unable to comply with a standard by its effective date
because of unavailability of personnel or unavailability of materials and
equipment or because required construction or alteration of facilities
cannot be completed by the effective date.123 In addition, the employer
must show that it is taking all available steps to protect its employees
against the hazards covered by the standard and that it has an effective
program for coming into compliance with the standard as soon as
practicable.124 Any variance issued by the Secretary must prescribe the
practices the employer must use while the order is in effect.125
ESA. Finally, Congress has authorized the issuance of hardshipbased adjustments to the prohibition on the taking of endangered species
in the ESA. If any person enters into a contract regarding a species of
fish, wildlife, or plant before notice is published in the Federal Register
listing that species as endangered, and if the subsequent listing of the
species will cause “undue economic hardship to such person under the
contract,” then the Secretary of the Interior may exempt the person from
the taking prohibition “in order to minimize such hardship.”126 The
statute defines undue economic hardship to include substantial economic
120. Id. A suspension may not last more than four months and may be disapproved by EPA if it
does not meet the requirements for implementation plans under the CAA. Id. § 7410(g)(2).
121. Id. § 7410(g)(3).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A) (2000).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Any employer seeking a variance must certify that it has informed employees of the
application for a variance. Id. § 655(b)(6)(B)(v).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b)(1). No exemption may last more than one year from the date of
publication in the Federal Register of notice of consideration of the species concerned. Id.
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loss resulting from inability to perform the contract, substantial economic
loss to persons who derived a significant portion of their income from the
lawful procurement of any listed species, or curtailment of subsistence
taking made unlawful by the ESA.127 The Secretary may only grant a
hardship exemption upon finding that it was applied for in good faith, it
will not operate to the disadvantage of the endangered species concerned,
and it will be consistent with the ESA’s purposes.128
b. Evaluation
Congress provided for hardship-based adjustments in all five of the
statutes that we have studied. A firm is entitled to a hardship-based
adjustment because of its financial difficulty in meeting its regulatory
obligations. Although such hardship does not excuse a regulated entity
from reducing risks to people or the environment, it may justify a lesser
regulatory burden. Thus, unlike a harm-based adjustment, this back-end
process exposes people or the environment to greater risks than if a firm
were required to comply with the existing regulatory requirement. These
provisions reflect one of the ways that Congress takes into account
regulatory costs without relying on a cost-benefit test to establish the
level of regulation.129
Congress has sought to balance cost concerns with regulatory
protection in various ways. The CWA permits EPA to modify some
regulatory requirements applicable to point sources if those requirements
are not “within the economic capability” of a regulated entity, but the
revised requirement must “result in reasonable further progress toward
the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.”130 RCRA permits EPA to
defer compliance with land disposal prohibitions based on the
unavailability of necessary technology or disposal capacity.131 The CAA
permits states to issue variances from implementation plan requirements
that accommodate economic concerns, but after these adjustments, the
state must still come into compliance with national air quality

127. Id. § 1539(b)(2). “The Secretary may make further requirements for a showing of undue
economic hardship as he deems fit.” Id. § 1539(b)(3).
128. Id. § 1539(d). These limitations also apply to the technology-improving exemption for
experimental populations described below. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which costs are
taken into account in regulatory statutes). See also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c); supra note 99 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
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standards.132 OSHA is permitted to grant variances from occupational
safety and health standards based on the unavailability of personnel or
materials, but only if the employer commits to taking all necessary steps
to safeguard employees against the relevant workplace hazards.133 The
ESA authorizes exemptions from the taking prohibition based on “undue
economic hardship,” but only if the exemption will not operate to the
disadvantage of the species concerned and will be consistent with
statutory purposes.134
As a general proposition, we think that regulated entities should
qualify for hardship-based adjustments when regulations will produce
excessive regulatory costs, but only if the public and the environment are
still substantially protected. We understand that regulation can increase
the cost of business for firms, and sometimes substantially so, but
existing statutes commit the country to a precautionary tilt in favor of
protecting people and the environment.135 That tilt is reflected in the
willingness of Congress to force some plants unable to comply with their
regulatory obligations to shut down.136 As one court noted in connection
with the CWA, “Congress clearly contemplated that cleaning up the
nation’s waters might necessitate the closing of some marginal plants.”137
A back-end process that granted regulatory relief without a
demonstration of significant economic dislocation would be inconsistent
with this approach. So would a regulatory system that fails to obtain
significant protection for the public in order to account for excessive
costs. While some adjustment may be necessary because of high costs,
the public and the environment should still be substantially protected.
On their face, the previous provisions appear to meet these
objectives. The devil, of course, is in the details. The way in which
regulators interpret these provisions can have a significant impact on
132. See supra notes 108-15and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l) (prohibiting EPA from
approving revision to an SIP “if the revision would interfere with any applicable requirement
concerning attainment and reasonable further progress”).
133. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
135. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 31.
136. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the
CWA).
137. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1052 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 491 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting 116 CONG. REC.
32,901–02 (1970), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1970, at 227 (1974), and indicating that Senator Muskie, the principal sponsor of the CAA,
construed the statute as seeking to protect the public health, “even if that means that ‘industries will
be asked to do what seems to be impossible at the present time’”).

24

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

how easily regulated entities qualify for an adjustment and how much
protection people and the environment actually receive. Because of the
frequent clash between the goals of regulatory statutes and the economic
self-interest of regulated entities, this category of back-end adjustments
is troublesome. Certainly, hardship-based adjustments have greater
potential to frustrate the goals of the statutes that authorize them than
either the harm-based adjustments considered above (which are based on
the absence of the harm sought to be avoided) or the technologyimprovement adjustments considered below (which are based on the
hope that potential long-term future risk reductions will more than offset
short-term increases in risk). We hesitate to endorse a system that
precludes all hardship-based adjustments for fear that such a system will
produce economic impacts that society deems unacceptable,138 thereby
reducing public support for and the legitimacy of the regulatory program.
At the same time, readily available hardship-based adjustments can
easily undercut the ability of a regulatory program to achieve its
protective goals. For this reason, the need to ensure that regulators are
accountable in their resolution of requests for hardship-based
adjustments is particularly important. The system of accountability
provided by statute must be capable of ensuring that back-end
adjustments, either individually or cumulatively, do not result in levels of
risk or harm antithetical to the regulatory programs designed to control
them. We consider the accountability of states and agencies when they
grant these adjustments below.
Having recognized that adjustments based on economic harm or
technological unavailability are probably inevitable, we nevertheless
reach the conclusion that such adjustments are inappropriate if the
regulatory requirement from which relief is sought is in the nature of a
technology-forcing mandate. A technology-forcing requirement is one
that is “expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop
pollution control devices [or other control mechanisms] that might at the
time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”139
Hardship-based adjustments to technology-forcing standards are
inappropriate because these adjustments frustrate the objective of
pushing regulated firms that are economically or technologically
138. But see supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent that
economically marginal firms shut down if unable to comply with CWA regulations).
139. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). See also Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing technology-forcing, or absolute, standards as
those that “require compliance with statutorily prescribed standards and time tables, irrespective of
present technologies. Absolute standards presume that industry can be driven to develop the
requisite technologies.”).
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incapable of compliance with current technology to develop new
technology that is capable of doing the job.
3. Technology-Improvement Adjustments
Congress has afforded relief to regulated entities under the five
statutes we surveyed using a third kind of back-end adjustment, namely
the technology-improvement adjustment. Such an adjustment grants
time extensions for regulatory obligations as an incentive for those
entities to engage in research to develop innovative technologies that will
help achieve health, safety, and environmental protection objectives
more effectively or more efficiently.
a. Availability
All of the statutes except RCRA contain examples of this type of
adjustment.
Our survey revealed the following illustrations of
technology-improvement adjustments.
CWA. The CWA offers back-end adjustments in the form of
deadline extensions based on an effort to induce the development of new
technology by regulated entities. The statute provides that EPA or an
authorized state may extend the deadline for compliance with the second
phase of the technology-based effluent limitations by as much as two
years.140 To qualify for such a deadline extension, the applicant must
show that it proposes to comply with the applicable effluent limitations
by “replacing existing production capacity with an innovative production
process which will result in an effluent reduction significantly greater
than required by the limitation otherwise applicable to such facility” or
with an innovative control technique that has a substantial likelihood for
achieving such an effluent reduction.141 Alternatively, the applicant can
qualify for a deadline extension if it demonstrates that it will use an
innovative system that has the potential for significantly lower costs than
the systems that EPA has determined to be economically achievable for
that kind of facility.142 A technology-forcing deadline extension under
the CWA is available only if EPA or the state determines that the
innovative technology has the potential for industry-wide application.143
140.
141.
142.
143.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(k) (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Congress apparently was willing to allow higher levels of pollution over
the short run at a particular point source if that point source committed to
developing innovative technology that had the potential for achieving
more effective or more efficient pollution control on an industry-wide
basis in the long run. The CWA provides a similar compliance deadline
extension for indirect dischargers proposing to comply with pretreatment
requirements through the use of innovative systems.144
CAA.
The CAA contains a similar technology-improvement
adjustment mechanism that applies to new stationary sources of air
pollution.145 Any person proposing to own or operate a new source may
request that EPA issue a waiver from federal standards of performance
“to encourage the use of an innovative technological system of
continuous emission reduction.”146 EPA may issue such a waiver if it
finds that the proposed system has not been adequately demonstrated, the
proposed system will operate effectively and there is a substantial
likelihood that it will achieve greater continuous emission reduction than
required under the standard or achieve at least an equivalent reduction at
lower cost, and the source shows that the “proposed system will not
cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public health, welfare, or
safety in its operation.”147 No waiver may be issued if it would prevent
attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS,148 and the number of waivers
issued with respect to a proposed system of emission reduction may not
exceed the number EPA deems necessary to ascertain whether or not the
system will achieve the desired results without creating unreasonable
risks to health, welfare, or safety.149
Another technology-improvement adjustment created by the CAA
relates to compliance with emission standards applicable to stationary
sources of hazardous air pollutants. EPA or a state with an EPAapproved permit program may issue a permit allowing an existing source
to meet an alternative emission limitation if the source demonstrates that
it has achieved a reduction of 90 percent or more in emissions for six
years from the date the regulatory standard would otherwise have
144. Id. § 1317(e). The extension is available only if EPA or the state determines that issuance
of the extension will not cause a publicly owned treatment works to violate its permit or applicable
sewage sludge disposal requirements. Id. § 1317(e)(2)(A).
145. A “new source” for these purposes is one upon which “construction or modification
commenced after the publication of regulations (or . . . proposed regulations) prescribing a standard
of performance” for the relevant category of sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2000).
146. Id. § 7411(j)(1)(A).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 7411(j)(1)(B)(i).
149. Id. § 7411(j)(1)(C).
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applied, provided the source achieved that reduction before the standard
was first proposed.150 The apparent purpose of this provision was to
provide incentives for sources of hazardous air pollutants to begin
reducing their emissions even before they were required to do so in
exchange for the promise of relatively lenient emission controls when
standards for its category of source were eventually promulgated.
The CAA also authorizes EPA to waive the provisions of emission
standards for motor vehicle engines to encourage the development of
better pollution control technology. EPA may issue a waiver of the
standard for emissions of oxides of nitrogen from light-duty engines and
vehicles upon the petition of a motor vehicle manufacturer if the
manufacturer demonstrates that a “waiver is necessary to permit the use
of an innovative power train technology, or innovative emission control
device or system.”151 The waiver is available only if it would not
endanger public health, there is a substantial likelihood that compliance
will be possible when the waiver expires, and the technology has a
“potential for long-term air quality benefit and has the potential to meet
or exceed the average fuel economy standard.”152
Even the market-based acid deposition control provisions allow for
adjustments as a means of improving pollution control performance. The
1990 amendments to the CAA provided for the allocation of
“allowances” to regulated sources of sulfur dioxide emissions.153 The
statute prohibits any source from emitting sulfur dioxide in excess of its
allowances.154 Allowances may be bought and sold155 so that a source
able to limit its sulfur dioxide emissions to amounts lower than the
allowances it holds may sell its excess allowances either to another
source unable to comply with the emissions cap represented by its
allocation of allowances or to a public interest group that wants to retire
allowances from the system. The statute allows a regulated source to
propose in its permit application to reassign its sulfur dioxide reduction
requirements to any other unit under the control of the same owner or
operator.156 EPA may approve the reassignment if it concludes that the
150. Id. § 7412(i)(5)(A).
151. Id. § 7521(b)(3).
152. Id. No waiver “shall apply to more than 5 percent of such manufacturer’s production or
more than fifty thousand vehicles or engines, whichever is greater.” Id.
153. Id. § 7651b(a)(1).
154. Id. § 7651c(a)(1). Each allowance constitutes authorization for its holder to emit one ton of
sulfur dioxide during a calendar year. Id. § 7651a(3).
155. Id. § 7651b(b).
156. Id.
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reassigned tonnage limits will “achieve the same or greater emissions
reduction than would have been achieved” by the transferring source if
not for the reassignment.157 Regulated sources also may petition EPA for
extensions of the deadlines for meeting emission limitation requirements
under the acid deposition control program based on the use of certain
technologies.158
OSH Act. The Secretary of Labor has broad authority to issue
technology-improvement adjustments from occupational safety and
health standards under the OSH Act. The Secretary may grant a variance
from any such standard whenever he or she determines, or the Secretary
of Health and Human Services certifies, that a variance is necessary to
permit an employer to participate in an experiment approved by one of
the two Secretaries that is “designed to demonstrate or validate new and
improved techniques to safeguard the health or safety of workers.”159
The statute contains no limitations on the number of variances the
Secretary may issue or on the duration of any variances issued.
ESA. The ESA also contains a provision authorizing what might be
regarded as analogous to a technology-improvement adjustment. The
Secretary of the Interior may permit any act that would otherwise qualify
as a prohibited taking if it is for “scientific purposes or to enhance the
propagation or survival of the affected species, including acts necessary
for the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations.”160
As Holly Doremus has explained, “[g]iving landowners permission
knowingly or deliberately to take introduced animals in the course of
agricultural or other activities on the property will encourage them to
host reintroductions. Provided the introduced population can absorb the
authorized take, such regulations would further the conservation of the
species.”161
b. Evaluation
When an agency grants a hardship adjustment, it permits a regulated
entity to engage in less protection of people and the environment in light
of the excessive costs involved in meeting the level of mandated
regulation.
A technology-improvement adjustment has another
157. Id. § 7651c(b)(5).
158. Id. § 7651c(d)(1).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(C).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A). For discussion of the ESA’s treatment of experimental
populations, see generally Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being
Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
161. Doremus, supra note 160, at 30.
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objective. Under this approach, an agency can grant relief from a
regulatory mandate if an adjustment is likely to produce either the
intended level of protection at lower cost or more environmental
protection than required by an existing mandate.
This kind of adjustment has the potential to improve regulatory
policy because Congress has been reasonably specific in demanding that
there be some advantage in making a technology-improvement
adjustment. EPA can grant deadline extensions from technology-based
effluent limitations under the CWA but only if an existing point source is
committed to developing innovative technology that has the potential to
achieve more efficient or more effective pollution control on an
industrywide basis in the long run.162 Under the CAA, new stationary
sources163 and stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants164 can obtain
waivers from the obligation to comply with existing abatement
obligations if they propose to use innovative technologies, but only if
there is evidence that the alternative would produce about the same level
of protection. A similar waiver concerning emissions standards for
motor vehicle emissions is likewise conditioned on evidence that the
public health would not be endangered and the new technology is likely
to be an improvement over existing technologies.165 EPA can also make
adjustments in the market-based acid rain deposition control provisions,
but only if the adjustment will result in the same or greater emissions
reductions than would have been achieved without the adjustment.166
Congress has made similar provisions in the other statutes. OSHA
can grant a variance if it is necessary to participate in an experiment to
improve worker safety and health.167 The Secretary of Interior may
permit actions that otherwise would violate the taking prohibition of the
ESA for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of
a species.168
The fact that an agency’s power to make an adjustment is
conditioned on ensuring that the public and the environment receive a
similar level or greater level of protection (at least in the long run) makes
this category of adjustments similar to harm-based adjustments. These
provisions rationalize regulation because they permit agencies to obtain a
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
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similar or enhanced level of protection through the production of more
efficient or more effective abatement technologies. Assuming that there
is an accurate agency determination regarding the degree to which the
public is protected and the potential for an improved technology, this
provision aids innovation and cost reduction.
4. Fairness-Based Adjustments
The previous adjustments addressed instances where a regulated
entity does not present the same level of risk a regulation addresses,
where compliance with a regulation presents an economic hardship, or
where the agency is willing to allow more time for regulatory
compliance in exchange for extracting a commitment from industry to
engage in technology-improving research and development. A fourth
ground upon which regulatory relief may be available for individual
regulated entities is fairness. A fairness-based adjustment addresses
factors that affect compliance other than the risks created by a regulated
entity, the cost of compliance, or the desire to provide technologyimproving incentives.
a. Availability
Our survey revealed two examples of fairness-based adjustments.
Congress has provided for such adjustments under the CWA and RCRA.
CWA. As enacted in 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(now known as the CWA) did not provide for adjustments of
industrywide effluent limitations for individual point sources on fairness
grounds. EPA developed by regulation, however, a mechanism called a
“fundamentally different factor” or FDF variance, pursuant to which
applicable effluent limitations could be made either more or less
stringent to the extent that “factors relating to the equipment or facilities
involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such
discharger are fundamentally different from the factors considered” by
EPA in issuing the effluent limitations for the category or class of point
sources involved.169 The Supreme Court held in an early CWA case that
EPA’s authority to issue effluent limitations by regulation for classes or

169. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 122–23 & n.10 (1977) (quoting 40
C.F.R. §§ 415.72, 415.222 (1976)).
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categories of point sources was contingent on the availability of
variances for individual plants.170
Congress codified the FDF variance mechanism when it adopted the
1987 amendments to the CWA. The statute now provides that EPA, with
the concurrence of the state, may establish an alternative effluent
limitation that modifies those requirements of the classwide effluent
limitation regulations that would otherwise apply to an individual point
source171 if the individual facility applying for the alternative
requirement demonstrates that “the facility is fundamentally different
with respect to the factors (other than cost)” which EPA considered in
establishing the classwide effluent limitation regulations.172 The statute
further specifies that “the alternative requirement may be no less
stringent than is justified by the fundamental difference” and that it must
not “result in a nonwater quality environmental impact which is
markedly more adverse than the impact” EPA considered in establishing
the classwide regulations.173 The premise behind the FDF variance
mechanism is that if EPA had known about the unique (fundamentally
different) situation of the individual point source when it issued the
effluent limitation regulations for the industry involved, it would have
concluded that the point source merited differential treatment based on
its unique situation.174 That differential treatment could have been
170. Id. at 128. The Court later held that EPA did not have to make FDF variances from the
phase one effluent limitations available on the basis of the economic capability of an individual point
source to afford the costs of the classwide effluent limitation regulations. EPA v. Nat’l Crushed
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 73–78 (1980). Thus, the FDF variance developed by EPA was not a
hardship-based adjustment mechanism. A greater than normal cost of compliance, however, could
provide the basis for a variance. Id. at 68 n.5 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 50,042 (1978)).
171. These FDF variances are also available to indirect dischargers subject to categorical
pretreatment standards on the same grounds. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n)(1). Indirect dischargers are
facilities that send their waste for treatment at a publicly owned treatment works instead of
discharging it directly into waters of the United States.
172. Id. § 1311(n)(1)(A).
173. Id. § 1311(n)(1)(C), (D). The statute requires that the application be based solely on
information submitted to EPA during the rulemaking for establishment of the classwide regulations
specifically raising the factors that are fundamentally different for the applicant or on information
the applicant did not have a reasonable opportunity to submit during the rulemaking. Id. §
1311(n)(1)(B). Thus, the fundamentally different factor must be one that EPA ignored during the
rulemaking or that EPA did not have the opportunity to consider at the time of the rulemaking.
174. EPA’s regulations explain that data which could affect the nationally applicable effluent
limitations may not be available or may not be considered during the development of the limitations.
As a result, it may be necessary on a case-by-case basis to adjust the national limits, and
make them either more or less stringent as they apply to certain dischargers within an
industrial category or subcategory. This will only be done if data specific to that
discharger indicate it presents factors fundamentally different from those considered by
EPA in developing the limit at issue.
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accommodated by creating a separate class for the point source involved.
The issuance of an FDF variance “simply represents an alternative
procedural mechanism for accomplishing the same result—essentially,
promulgation of a rule applicable to a category of one entity.”175
RCRA. RCRA also authorizes what appears to be a fairness-based
variance that is analogous to the CWA’s FDF variance. In addition to
authorizing EPA to extend the deadline for compliance with one of the
statute’s land disposal prohibitions for a category of facilities, RCRA
allows EPA to issue extensions of the deadlines for complying with the
same prohibitions on a case-by-case basis. The applicant for such an
extension (which the statute refers to as a variance) must demonstrate
that there is a binding contractual commitment to construct or otherwise
provide alternative treatment, storage, or disposal capacity but that, due
to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant, that capacity cannot
reasonably be made available by the deadline.176 We characterize this as
a fairness-based adjustment because it appears to be based on the
presence of unique circumstances that render a particular treatment,
storage, or disposal facility unable to comply with a land disposal
prohibition, even though the rest of the industry can. In light of those
unique circumstances, it is fair to provide individualized relief to the
affected regulated entity.
b. Evaluation
Fairness-based adjustments are made when a regulatory requirement
is not a rational policy choice because of the unique situation of the
regulated entity. The entity presents the same risk as other firms, and
thus it is not entitled to a harm-based exemption. The entity is not
claiming excessive cost, and thus it is not entitled to a hardship
exemption.177 Rather, it is entitled to a variance because it is in a
fundamentally different situation than other firms that create the same
type of risks, and it is therefore inequitable to treat it in the same manner

40 C.F.R. § 125.30(b) (2003).
175. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 130–31 (1985)).
Under EPA regulations, however, the FDF variance is issued in the context of informal adjudication
rather than informal rulemaking. See infra notes 245–51 and accompanying text.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(h)(3). The extension is limited to one year, renewable for one additional
year. Id.
177. See, e.g., EPA v. Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (upholding EPA’s refusal
to issue FDF variances to point sources regulated under the CWA on the basis of economic inability
to comply with regulatory obligations).
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as the regulations treat more typically situated firms.178 For example, a
factory in Alaska may not be able to employ the same pollution reduction
technology as other firms because of the extreme cold in many months of
the year. Had the agency known about this situation at the time it had
written its regulation, it could have written a different regulation for
firms in this situation.179
Although Congress has permitted adjustments on this basis under the
CWA, it has also required that any alternative requirement be no less
stringent than is justified by the regulated firm’s unique situation.180 The
CWA’s FDF variance provision also requires the applicant for a variance
to demonstrate that the relief it seeks will not result in a
disproportionately adverse non-water quality impact.181 By limiting the
level of relief provided by the variance to the amount justified by the
fundamentally different factor, the statute provides some safeguards
against the creation of increased environmental risk. In a sense, this
restriction represents an attempt to ensure that the recipient of a variance
“do the most it can” to protect the environment, in light of its unique
situation. EPA’s regulations include an additional requirement that a
variance recipient maintain pre-existing regulatory requirements.182 We
would be more comfortable with a statutory fairness-based adjustment
that not only restricts relief to the level justified by the unique situation
involved but also insists upon maintenance of some minimum level of
health, safety, or environmental protection.
Congress has built similar protective safeguards into the provision of
RCRA that arguably qualifies as a fairness-based adjustment.183 EPA
may issue individualized relief from RCRA’s land disposal prohibitions
based on the unavailability of alternative treatment, storage, or disposal
capacity only if the affected hazardous waste is disposed in a facility that
complies with minimum technological requirements, such as liners and
groundwater monitoring.184
5. Policy Conflict-Based Adjustments

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra notes 172-74and accompanying text.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(n)(1)(D).
40 C.F.R. § 125.31(b)(2) (2003).
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 6924(h)(4), (o).
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All of the previous adjustments focus on policy factors related to the
statute being enforced by an agency. Congress has sometimes provided
for the modification of regulatory requirements when compliance with
those requirements would conflict with other policy objectives that
Congress has deemed important.
a. Availability
Our survey found a number of policy factors that Congress uses to
make conflict-based adjustments. Agencies are authorized to make
adjustments in light of small business status, nationality security, energy
policy, and other factors. With one moribund exception, however,
Congress has not authorized adjustments to promote economic
efficiency.
Small Businesses. Congress often has accommodated important
social values by affording preferential treatment to small business
entities. As Professor Richard Pierce has explained, “[t]he belief that
small is good and big is bad is deeply rooted in our culture and has
affected the contours of the United States legal system significantly since
the nation’s founding.”185 The government’s decision to promote the
values associated with small business enterprise is reflected in the fact
that “[e]very regulatory system includes a variety of features that confer
favorable treatment on small firms.”186
One example of this pattern of relatively lenient treatment for small
businesses arises under RCRA. RCRA required that EPA promulgate
standards by 1986 for regulation of hazardous waste that is generated in
small quantities.187 These standards, which were to include standards
relating to the legitimate use, reuse, recycling, and reclamation of such
wastes, could vary from the standards applicable to hazardous waste
generated by large quantity generators but had to be sufficient to protect
human health and the environment.188 EPA regulations under the CAA
provide for economic hardship extensions for small refiners of the
deadlines for complying with requirements for sulfur in gasoline.189
185. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998).
186. Id. at 539. According to Pierce, EPA alone has nearly fifty regulations in which the scope
or stringency of the regulation varies with firm size or amount of pollution emitted. Id. at 542 n.25
(citing CHARLES BROWN ET AL., EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL 82–83 (1990)).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(1).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)(2).
189. 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.225–80.270 (2003). See also id. §§ 80.550–80.553 (listing similar deadline
extensions from requirements of diesel fuel sulfur control program).
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National Security. A common ground for issuance of back-end
adjustments is the potential for health, safety, or environmental
regulation to conflict with the national security interests of the United
States.190 Many federal pollution control statutes require that federally
owned facilities comply with regulatory requirements to the same extent
as nongovernmental entities engaged in the same activity. The statutes
also authorize exemptions, however, to protect national security. The
CWA, for example, authorizes the President to exempt any effluent
source operated by a federal agency from compliance with water
pollution requirements “if he determines it to be in the paramount
interest of the United States to do so.”191 In addition, the President may
exempt from regulation any weaponry, equipment, aircraft, vessels,
vehicles, and other property (and access to property) owned or operated
by the armed forces on the same grounds.192 The President has similar
authority to provide exemptions from the obligations of federal facilities
to comply with regulatory requirements on national security grounds
under RCRA193 and the CAA.194 The CAA also empowers the President
to issue exemptions on national security grounds from national emission
standards for hazardous air pollutants195 and from the prohibition on
production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals.196 The OSH Act
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue “reasonable variations,
tolerances, and exemptions” from any statutory requirements “as he may
find necessary and proper to avoid serious impairment of the national
defense.”197 Finally, the ESA allows the Endangered Species Committee
to grant an exemption from the no jeopardy prohibition for any agency

190. “Historically, the call of military necessity has been in direct conflict with the goal of
environmental protection. National security and environmental regulation were seen as an either/or
proposition, with the environment uniformly sacrificed in the name of national defense.” Joshua E.
Latham, The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation of Munitions, 27 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 467, 469 (2000).
191. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
192. Id. § 1323(a).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (authorizing the President to exempt any federal solid waste
management facility if it is in the paramount interest of the United States).
194. Id. § 7418(b). The CAA exemption authority also applies to weaponry, equipment, aircraft,
vehicles, or other classes of property owned or operated by the armed forces or by the National
Guard of any state and which are “uniquely military in nature.” Id.
195. Id. § 7412(i)(4).
196. Id. § 7671c(f). EPA must determine that adequate substitutes are not available. Id.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 665.
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action if the Secretary of Defense finds that it is necessary for reasons of
national security.198
Energy Policy. The CAA provides a back-end adjustment based on
the potential conflict between national environmental and energy policy
objectives. Upon application by the owner or operator of a fuel burning
stationary source, the governor of the state in which the source is located
may petition the President to determine that an energy emergency exists
justifying a temporary suspension of part of an applicable state
implementation plan, provided there are no other adequate means of
responding to the energy emergency.199 If the President determines that
an emergency exists, the governor may issue a temporary suspension of
the plan. The governor may issue a suspension to a source only if the
governor finds that a temporary energy emergency exists in the vicinity
of the source involving high levels of unemployment or loss of necessary
energy supplies for residences and that the unemployment or loss of
supplies can be alleviated by the suspension.200 A suspension may
authorize a delay in any compliance schedule or increment of progress to
which the source is subject.201 EPA also has provided for the issuance of
back-end adjustments by regulation in situations where regulatory
compliance would adversely affect national energy policy.202
Other Objectives. Back-end adjustments serve to accommodate a
variety of other policy concerns. The CAA provides a host of exceptions
from the phase-out of production and consumption of substances with the
potential to deplete the stratospheric ozone layer based on the need to
promote policy goals other than protection of air quality. EPA has the
power to authorize the production of chemical substances otherwise
scheduled to be phased out if the substances are used for “essential
applications” (such as testing for metal fatigue and corrosion in airplane
engines and parts),203 are used in medical devices,204 are necessary for
aviation safety purposes,205 are necessary to comply with sanitation or
198. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(iii). The no jeopardy prohibition is described below at notes
209–11 and accompanying text.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1)(A)–(B). The President may not delegate this authority to anyone
else. Id.
200. Id. § 7410(f)(2)(A)–(B).
201. Id. § 7410(f)(5).
202. See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing for
variances from cooling water intake structure requirements under the CWA if compliance would
result in “significant adverse impacts on local energy markets”) (40 C.F.R. § 125.85(a)(2) (2003)).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(d)(1).
204. Id. § 7671c(d)(2); see also id. § 7671d(d)(1) (allowing use of methyl chloroform in medical
devices pursuant to subsection (d)(2)).
205. Id. § 7671c(d)(3).
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food protection,206 or are used for purposes of fire suppression or
explosion prevention.207 EPA also may authorize the production of
ozone-depleting substances for export to developing countries.208
Policy conflicts also provide the basis for back-end adjustments
under the ESA. The ESA mandates that federal agencies insure that their
actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such species.”209 A federal agency, a
governor, or an applicant for a federal permit or license, however, may
apply to the Endangered Species Committee for an exemption from this
“no jeopardy” prohibition.210 The Committee may grant an exemption if
it determines that
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed
agency action; (ii) the benefits of [the] action clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the
species or its critical habitat, and [the] action is in the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and (iv) neither
the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources [to the proposed
action].211

The exemption also must establish reasonable mitigation and
enhancement measures as are necessary to minimize the adverse effects
of the agency action upon the listed species and its critical habitat.212
The second factor listed above justifies characterizing this exemption as
a policy conflict-based adjustment. The benefits of the action that
qualify it for an exemption are presumably economic or social benefits of
some kind, and the action must be in the public interest despite its
adverse impacts on listed species.
Similarly, the ESA provides for policy conflict-based adjustments to
the statutory prohibition on the taking of endangered species.213 The
statute authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue a permit for any
206. Id. § 7671c(d)(5).
207. Id. § 7671c(g)(1).
208. Id. § 7671c(e)(1).
209. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
210. Id. § 1536(g)(1).
211. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
212. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B).
213. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting any person from taking any endangered species of fish
or wildlife located “within the United States or the territorial sea[s] of the United States”).
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taking that “is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.”214 To qualify for an incidental take permit, an
applicant must submit to the agency a habitat conservation plan (HCP)
that specifies the impact that will likely result from the taking, the steps
the applicant will take to diminish those impacts, and the alternative
actions the applicant considered and the reasons why they were not
pursued.215 The Secretary must issue the incidental take permit if he or
she finds that the taking will be incidental, the applicant will take
practicable steps to diminish the impacts of the taking, the applicant will
make sure adequate funding for the HCP will be provided, and the taking
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild.216 The permit must contain whatever terms and
conditions the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate, including
reporting requirements.217 Although the statute does not specify what
policies might override the desire to protect endangered species, we
characterized this mechanism as a policy conflict-based adjustment
because the strict application of the taking prohibition is subordinated to
an activity designed to serve some other legitimate purpose that has the
incidental effect of causing the taking of an endangered species. The
requirements that the applicant minimize and mitigate adverse impacts
on listed species and demonstrate that the taking will not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species provide
protection against harm to species despite issuance of the permit.218
Other ESA adjustments clearly qualify as policy conflict-based
adjustments. The President has the authority under the ESA to issue an
exemption from the no jeopardy prohibition for projects for the repair or
replacement of public facilities adversely affected by natural disasters.219
In addition, the statute specifies that the taking prohibition generally does
not apply to the taking of any endangered or threatened species by
Alaskan natives if the taking is for subsistence purposes.220 No taking
for subsistence purposes may be accomplished in a wasteful manner.221

214. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
215. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
216. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(i)–(iv).
217. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(v).
218. The ESA contains a similar exemption from the taking prohibition for agency actions for
which the FWS has issued an incidental take statement. Id. § 1536(o)(2).
219. Id. § 1536(p). EPA may grant exemptions on similar grounds from the gasoline toxics
provisions. 40 C.F.R. § 80.995 (2003).
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1).
221. Id. § 1539(e)(2).
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Economic Efficiency. Economic efficiency may conflict with health,
safety, or environmental regulation. If the costs of complying with a
regulation exceed the benefits that society derives from the regulation,
compliance with the regulation generates economic inefficiency because
the regulation yields a net decline in social welfare. Just as Congress
rarely has authorized agencies to promulgate health, safety, or
environmental regulation pursuant to a cost-benefit test,222 it rarely has
authorized agencies to provide relief on cost-benefit grounds from
regulations promulgated pursuant to some other substantive criterion.
One statute in which it has done so is the CWA, which authorizes EPA,
with the concurrence of the state, to issue a permit that modifies effluent
limitations on the ground that there is no reasonable relationship between
the economic and social costs and the benefits to be obtained from
compliance.223 EPA has never implemented this provision, however, and
it has been characterized as a “dead letter.”224 The bill that became the
CWA originally included a provision that would have authorized the
issuance of variances to modified new point sources on cost-benefit
grounds, but the provision was deleted in conference and was never
adopted.225
b. Evaluation
The previous provisions all involve environmental policy objectives
and considerations of implementation costs and technologies. This
category of adjustments permits EPA to take into account other policy
considerations, including the promotion of small business,226 national
security,227 energy policy,228 and other policies.229

222. See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 32.
223. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A).
224. Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard
Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 414 (1997) (quoting
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 26 (2d ed. 1994)); see also JOHN E. BONINE &
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CASES-LEGISLATIONPOLICIES 346 (2d ed. 1992).
225. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192–93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing S. 2770, 92d
Cong., § 2, at 93 (1971); H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. § 2, at 297; S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 128–29
(1972)).
226. See supra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 203–218 and accompanying text.
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As a general matter, it is rational for agencies to take into account
important public policies that impact a few entities and that were not part
of the agency’s considerations when it promulgated a regulation. This
assumes, of course, that the extraneous policy objective itself is valid,
and some of these objectives have been the subject of criticism. Some
analysts, for example, are skeptical about the regulatory breaks that
Congress has given small business.230 It also assumes that Congress or
the agency properly balances environmental and other regulatory goals
with these other concerns when it provides relief from environmental
regulation. After September 11, 2001, for example, it has become more
difficult to know how to balance national security concerns with
environmental protection mandates.231
Congress generally has limited the use of these adjustments in ways
that protect people and the environment. In some cases, the adjustment
is a time extension, after which the regulated entity must come into
compliance.232 In other cases, Congress has required as much regulatory
protection as is feasible in light of the other policy objectives.233 Some
of the national security adjustments, however, provide unqualified
authority for the President or an agency to exempt regulated entities from
the need to obey federal regulations.234 Thus, the extent of public and
environmental protection will depend on how many times these
exemptions are invoked and the extent of the risks posed by the
exempted activities. If the exemption provisions are only used
occasionally and are limited to relatively small-scale risks, they would
not generally impact the level of protection. But even in those situations

230. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 185, at 576 (“[s]pecial treatment of small firms has little
beneficial effect on society and a host of serious bad effects”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy
Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 98, 132–33 (2000). C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis
of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2004), contends
that small business exemptions may or may not be efficient depending on the size of the transactions
costs involved in granting the exemptions. The same author also has analyzed whether regulatory
exemptions in general are economically justified. C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory
Exemptions, 72 UMKC L. REV. 857 (2004).
231. See Christopher Gozdor, et al., Where Streets Have No Name: The Collision of
Environmental Law and Information Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10978
(2003).
232. See, e.g., supra note 189 and accompanying text (time extension under RCRA for small
businesses); supra note 200 and accompanying text (temporary suspension under CAA).
233. See, e.g., supra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining that the ESA requires
reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures); supra note 217 and accompanying text
(explaining that the ESA requires such other measures as the agency determines are necessary and
appropriate).
234. See, e.g., supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text.
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they may have a significant adverse impact on persons living near the
facility that is exempted.235
6. Open-Ended Adjustments
As the survey of statutory back-end adjustments above demonstrates,
Congress typically spells out in the statute the criteria the agency must
use in deciding whether to provide a particular kind of back-end
adjustment. Occasionally, however, the statute delegates broad authority
to the agency to decide not only whether to issue such adjustments but
also the grounds upon which to issue them.
a. Availability
Our survey found only one example of an open-ended authorization.
It relates to EPA’s authority under the CWA to issue standards of
performance for marine sanitation devices, which are devices for sewage
treatment by vessels.236 The statute allows the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating to “waive applicability
of standards and regulations as necessary or appropriate” for individual
vessels.237 The statute provides no guidance on when such a waiver
would be necessary or appropriate.
b. Evaluation
The previous categories of adjustments are based on specific criteria
that Congress has established. Congress, however, has not always
limited an agency’s discretion in this fashion. The CWA, for example,
authorizes EPA to waive the applicability of standards and regulations
relating to marine sanitation devices “as necessary or appropriate.”238
This type of authorization is highly problematic as a policy matter
because it fails to rein in EPA’s authority by specifying the factors the
agency is to balance in granting an adjustment. There is no need for
Congress to do business in this fashion. As the previous discussion
indicates, Congress has a number of ways that it can provide for
235. See Gozdor et al., supra note 231, at 10984 (highlighting stories of water pollution at
military installations).
236. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(1), 1321(a)(3) (2000).
237. Id. § 1322(c)(2).
238. Id.
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adjustments and provide for specific criteria that indicate when a
regulated entity is eligible for the adjustment. As Judge Leventhal
stated:
Sound administrative procedure contemplates waivers, or exceptions
granted only pursuant to a relevant standard—expressed at least in
decisions accompanied by published opinions, especially during a
period when an approach is in formation, but best expressed in a rule
that obviates discriminatory approaches. The agency may not act out
of unbridled discretion or whim in granting waivers any more than in
any other aspect of its regulatory function. The process viewed as a
whole leads to a general rule, and limited waivers or exceptions granted
pursuant to an appropriate general standard. This combination of a
general rule and limitations is the very stuff of the rule of law, and with
diligent effort and attention to essentials administrative agencies may
maintain the fundamentals of principled regulation without sacrifice of
administrative flexibility and feasibility.239

The absence of statutory standards for the issuance of back-end
adjustments invites arbitrary and discriminatory regulation, and the
absence of limitations requiring the agency to minimize health, safety, or
environmental risk creates the potential for the adjustment process to
thwart regulatory goals.
7. Conclusion
Congress has authorized a significant number of back-end
adjustments for a variety of purposes in the statutes that we surveyed.
Each of the five statutes we surveyed authorizes the administering
agency to make back-end adjustments to regulatory standards or
prohibitions. In all but one case (the CWA waivers for standards of
performance for sewage treatment by vessels), the statutes spell out the
substantive criteria for issuance of these adjustments. Each of the five
statutes allows an agency to alter regulatory requirements when the
activity for which an adjustment is sought does not pose a risk of the
kind of harm targeted by those requirements. All of the statutes provide
for some sort of adjustment based on economic hardship or technological
unavailability. Each, except RCRA, includes authorization to issue

239. WAIT Radio v.FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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technology-improvement adjustments.240
The CWA and RCRA
authorize adjustments on fairness grounds. All five statutes provide for
the issuance of adjustments as a means of avoiding a conflict between the
environmental goals that the regulatory standards seek to promote and
conflicting goals or policies that are allowed to trump the environmental
goals. National security concerns provide the most common such
conflict, but the statutes also seek to accommodate other concerns as
diverse as the viability of small businesses and preservation of the
lifestyle of Alaskan Natives.
For the most part, the criteria that Congress has established for the
issuance of back-end adjustments should lead to more rational public
policy according to the previous analysis. Each of the first five kinds of
back-end adjustments we described above has the potential to improve
regulatory policy. Harm-based adjustments preclude the need for a
regulated entity to incur compliance costs when it does not pose the kind
of risk to health, safety, or the environment that the regulation from
which the adjustment is sought was designed to prevent. Accordingly,
these adjustments prevent “treatment for treatment’s sake” by requiring
control when its absence would do no harm.
Hardship-based
adjustments provide a means for agencies to take cost into account in
determining the appropriate level of regulation for a particular regulated
entity without requiring the agency to conduct a formal cost-benefit
analysis. Information about the cost of compliance of a particular firm or
the availability of control technology to that firm is likely to be more
readily available and accurate than the results of a cost-benefit analysis
that requires quantification of values that are resistant to expression in
terms of dollars and cents (and that ought not to be so expressed on
moral grounds). Moreover, if a hardship-based adjustment is issued only
on the condition that the recipient of the adjustment continue to provide
substantial environmental protection, then such an adjustment should not
undercut the purpose of the regulatory program.
Technology-improvement adjustments enable the agency granting
them to allow greater levels of harm to occur in the short run in exchange
for a commitment on the part of the regulated entity receiving the
adjustment to conduct research and development into more effective or
efficient risk-reduction technology. If the research succeeds, the agency
240. RCRA perhaps lacks explicit authorization for technology-improvement adjustments
because the land disposal restrictions for certain hazardous wastes are themselves designed to
facilitate the development of effective treatment technologies.
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may be able to ratchet up the level of control for one or more entire
industries, thereby more than offsetting the short-term increase in risk
that resulted from issuance of the adjustment.
Fairness-based
adjustments permit the agency to promulgate regulations based on
representative conditions within an industry without having to take the
time to investigate every peculiarity within the regulated community. If
it later turns out that it does not make sense to apply the regulations to a
particular entity because it finds itself in a unique situation of which the
agency was not aware when it issued the classwide regulations, the
agency can adjust that entity’s obligations to accommodate its unique
situation. Finally, policy conflict-based adjustments reflect a recognition
on the part of Congress that there may be instances in which important
social policies (like protection of small businesses or the national
security) ought to override, at least in part, the desire to achieve
reductions in the risk to health, safety, or the environment. Instead of
simply sacrificing environmental values wholesale, the statutes vest in
the President or in a regulatory agency the authority to adjust the
obligations imposed by statute only to the extent necessary to
accommodate the conflicting policy. The adjustment is sometimes
conditioned by requiring the maintenance of some degree of protection
of health, safety, or the environment.
The conclusion that these kinds of back-end adjustments have the
potential to improve the rationality of regulation assumes that an agency
applies the criteria for issuance sensibly and in good faith. If not, backend adjustments have the potential to frustrate an agency’s statutory
mission to protect people and the environment. In light of this potential
downside to the back-end adjustment process, it is important to ensure
that agencies are accountable for the decisions they make to issue backend adjustments. In the next section, we discuss the degree to which
agencies are accountable under current legislation and recommend
changes to current procedures that would make agencies even more
accountable.
IV. THE BACK-END EFFORT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The efficacy of a back-end adjustment process depends not only on
suitable criteria but on how well an agency implements the process. This
section considers the potential for misuse of back-end adjustments and
then considers whether existing procedures sufficiently guard against this
potential. To make this determination, we surveyed the same five
statutes considered in Part III to identify what procedures are used. We
conclude that notice and comment procedures are generally sufficient to
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ensure the accountability of the back-end process if augmented by two
steps that would increase the transparency of the process for considering
back-end adjustments. We propose that agencies create electronic
reading rooms for back-end adjustment documents and report annually
on the back-end process.
A.

The Potential for Misuse

The statutory mission of an agency can be frustrated by the back-end
process in three ways. Regulators can rely too heavily on an adjustment
process, they can fail to consider the cumulative effects of adjustments,
or they can grant adjustments in bad faith.
Excessive reliance on back-end adjustments can water down a rule to
the point that it is far less effective in protecting the public or the
environment than it would be if implemented as designed and without
adjustments. Moreover, once the exceptions swallow a rule, regulatory
policy becomes incoherent.241 Excessive reliance on an adjustment
process also will encourage regulated entities not to comply with the
original rule. Companies will be reluctant to invest the money it takes to
comply with a regulation if they think there is a good chance that they
can obtain a favorable adjustment of some sort. Indeed, as noted above,
regulators should interpret a large number of legitimate applications for
adjustments as evidence that the original rule needs to be reassessed. In
this circumstance, reassessment is a more rational approach than granting
a large number of adjustments.
The integrity of a rule may also be threatened if regulators fail to
consider the cumulative impact of the adjustments.242 In particular,
regulators should be concerned that exceptions will cause some people or
some areas of the environment to be subject to greater risks than people
or areas in which the original regulation is enforced. This result may
occur if an agency grants adjustments to firms located in close proximity
to one another.
Finally, in the hands of industry-friendly regulators, an adjustment
process can become a means to water down regulation by granting
241. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 172.
242. Id.; see Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299 (1999) (arguing the broad
exception process created under the Endangered Species Act “threatens to eclipse the rest of the
statute”); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 138 (1998) (arguing that EPA’s
administration of Project XL has become a “regulatory free-for-all”).
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adjustments that are undeserved or weakly supported while maintaining
the illusion that a protective regulatory regime remains in place.243
B. The Administrative Process
This section surveys the five statutes under review to determine what
procedures agencies use to make back-end adjustments. The following
section then assesses how well these procedures guard against the
potential problems we have identified.
Agencies use both adjudication and rulemaking to adopt back-end
adjustments. Adjudication occurs when an agency determines the
outcome of a request for a back-end adjustment under a statutory
provision or regulation that makes an adjustment available if the
applicant meets certain criteria.244 Rulemaking is necessary when there
is no pre-existing statutory or regulatory provision that authorizes a backend adjustment. In this circumstance, a back-end adjustment requires an
agency to amend an existing regulation to permit the applicant to engage
in some form of adjusted compliance.
For both adjudication and rulemaking, agencies use three
approaches. For most adjudications and rulemakings, agencies provide
public notice (usually through publication in the Federal Register) and
allow the public to file comments on a proposed adjustment. In a few
instances, there may be a legislative-type hearing and there are three
situations in which agencies use formal, trial-like procedures.
1. Adjudication
Many of the back-end adjustments involve adjudication. We found
numerous examples of adjudications under the CWA, RCRA, the CAA,
and the ESA.
CWA. The CWA does not prescribe procedures for the issuance of
most of the back-end adjustments it authorizes. It is generally silent on
the procedures that EPA (or authorized permitting states) must use when
considering whether to issue hardship-based,245 harm-based,246
243. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 173.
244. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7) (2000) (defining adjudication under the APA).
245. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c), (i).
246. Id. § 1311(g). The statute does specify that modifications of secondary treatment
requirements for publicly owned treatment works shall take the form of permit provisions issued by
EPA with the concurrence of the state. Id. § 1311(h). Under EPA regulations, states may have to
certify compliance with the CWA in the course of considering variance requests under this
provision. 40 C.F.R. § 124.54 (2003).
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technology-improvement,247 fairness-based,248 policy conflict-based,249
and open-ended250 adjustments.251
Although the CWA does not specify any hearing procedures, EPA’s
regulations fill this gap. These procedural regulations apply generally to
the disposition of applications for permits or permit renewals by point
sources, and it is during this process that an applicant can apply for a
back-end adjustment.252 The regulations provide that “[d]ecisions on
[National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] variance requests
ordinarily will be made during the permit issuance process. Variances
and other changes in permit conditions ordinarily will be decided through
the same notice-and-comment and hearing procedures as the basic
permit.”253 The burden of proof for these adjustments is on the applicant
seeking the adjustment.254 The basic permit hearing procedures, which
also apply to the issuance of permits for treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities under RCRA,255 require that EPA (or a state authorized by EPA
to issue CWA or RCRA permits) provide public notice when the agency
has tentatively denied a permit, prepared a draft permit, or scheduled a
hearing.256 Public notice of the preparation of a draft permit or of a

247. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(k), 1317(e).
248. Id. § 1311(n).
249. Id. § 1323(a) (authorizing Presidential exemptions “in the paramount interest of the United
States”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(4) (authorizing a similar exemption under the CAA for federal
facilities from national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants on national security grounds);
id. § 7418(b) (authorizing CAA exemption for federal facilities “in the paramount interest of the
United States”); id. § 7671c(f) (authorizing Presidential exemptions under the CAA from
prohibitions on the production and use of ozone-depleting substances on national security grounds;
congressional notification required).
250. 33 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2).
251. In one case, the statute mandates that EPA “hold a public hearing” before modifying a
water quality-related effluent limitation. Id. § 1312(b)(1)–(2)(A). As indicated above, however,
EPA has never implemented this provision. See supra note 224 and accompanying text
252. The regulations specify time limits for the filing of requests for FDF variances, hardshipbased variances, and harm-based variances under the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(m)–(n) (2003).
253. Id. § 124.51(b).
254. See, e.g., id. § 125.32(b) (placing the burden on the person requesting FDF variances).
255. Id. § 124.1(a).
256. Id. § 124.10(a)(1). The contents of the notice are described at section 124.10(d)(1),
including a brief description of the comment procedures and the time and place of any hearing to be
held. The regulations also require that the applicant for a RCRA permit “hold at least one meeting
with the public in order to solicit questions from the community and inform the community of
proposed hazardous waste management activities.” Id. § 124.31(b). The applicant must provide at
least 30 days prior notice of the meeting. Id. § 124.31(d). In addition, EPA or the state must notify
the public that RCRA permit applications have been submitted and are available for review. Id. §
124.32(b)(1).
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decision to deny a permit requires at least thirty days for public
comment.257
The agency must “notify the applicant and each person who has
submitted written comments or requested notice of the final permit
decision.”258 The final decision must include a response to significant
comments on the draft permit raised during the comment period or
during a hearing.259 Final decisions must be based on the administrative
record, which includes the record for the draft permit, all comments
received during the comment period, the response to comments, and the
final permit.260 Within thirty days after the final permit decision, “any
person who filed comments on [the] draft permit . . . may petition the
Environmental Appeals Board to review any condition of the permit
decision.”261
One CWA adjustment may require a formal hearing. Decisions on
whether to issue a more lenient effluent limitation under the CWA for a
point source engaging in a thermal discharge must be made by EPA or
the state “after opportunity for public hearing.”262 One court has
concluded that this language triggers formal adjudication under the APA
for the imposition of thermal discharge limitations.263 This decision has
been criticized by commentators,264 and subsequent court decisions cast
doubt on whether formal adjudication is required under a statute merely
on the basis of a reference to an “opportunity for public hearing.”265
EPA’s regulations do not require formal adjudication for permit
decisions concerning thermal dischargers.266

257. Id. § 124.10(b)(1). For RCRA permits, the regulations require a minimum of 45 days
notice. Id.
258. Id. § 124.15(a). The regulations specify time frames for issuance of decisions on
adjustment requests when EPA is the permitting authority. Id. § 124.63.
259. Id. § 124.17(a)(2).
260. Id. § 124.18(a)–(b). The administrative record must also include the tape or transcript of
any hearing and of any written materials submitted at a hearing
261. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a). A person who participated in the public hearing is also qualified to
bring a lawsuit.
262. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000).
263. In Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), the court held
that formal adjudication was required in permit proceedings conducted under § 1326(a) even though
the statute does not require that the determination be made “on the record.” Id. at 876–78. See also
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833–34 (7th Cir. 1977).
264. E.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.2.1, at
202–04 (2d ed. 2001); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 8.2, at 382–83 (3d ed. 1994).
265. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(formal adjudication not required for issuance of corrective orders under RCRA).
266. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.66.
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RCRA. Like the CWA, RCRA provides little guidance as to the
procedures that should be used in considering requests for back-end
adjustments. The statute is silent on the procedures EPA must use in
determining whether to allow land disposal of hazardous wastes when an
entity asserts that the prohibition on disposal is not necessary to protect
health and the environment.267 Nor does the statute speak to what
procedures are necessary when EPA provides exemptions from
groundwater monitoring requirements or requirements relating to the
burning of hazardous waste as fuel.268 It does not indicate what
procedures the President must follow when he determines that “the
paramount interests of the United States” support exemption of federal
facilities from solid or hazardous waste management requirements.269
RCRA does allow hardship-based extensions of the deadlines for
compliance with land disposal prohibitions to be issued “after notice and
opportunity for comment and after consultation with appropriate State
agencies in all affected States.”270 Likewise, EPA or an authorized state
agency may modify the prohibition on the receipt, storage, or treatment
of hazardous waste at surface impoundments “after notice and
opportunity for comment.”271
EPA’s regulations describe notice and comment procedures for many
of the RCRA back-end adjustments, just as they do for many of the
adjustments available under the CWA.272 For example, “[a]ny person
who generates, treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous waste may submit
an application . . . for an extension to the effective date of any
applicable” RCRA restriction.273 EPA may grant an extension “after
notice and opportunity for comment, and after consultation with
appropriate State agencies in all affected States.”274 EPA must provide
public notice of its intent to approve or deny a petition and provide an
opportunity for public comment.275 Final decisions must be published in
the Federal Register.276 Entities subject to RCRA’s land disposal
267. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5).
268. Id. § 6924(p), (q).
269. Id. § 6961(a).
270. Id. § 6924(h)(3).
271. Id. § 6925(j)(4).
272. As indicated above, if any back-end adjustment is issued in the course of a RCRA permit
proceeding for treatment, storage, or disposal facilities, the procedures are similar to those that apply
to CWA permits. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
273. 40 C.F.R. § 268.5(a) (2003).
274. Id. § 268.5(e).
275. Id.
276. Id.
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restrictions also may submit a petition seeking exemptions from those
restrictions on the ground “that there will be no migration of hazardous
constituents from the disposal unit.”277 Again, EPA must provide notice
of its “intent to approve or deny a petition and provide an opportunity for
public comment” and must publish the final decision in the Federal
Register.278 The regulations also authorize a generator or treater of
hazardous waste to file a petition for a variance from the treatment
standards for hazardous wastes subject to land disposal restrictions.279
The procedures are the same as those that apply to petitions for
exemptions from the land disposal restrictions.280
CAA. The CAA does not specifically dictate procedures for the
issuance of some back-end adjustments, such as hardship-based
adjustments to primary nonferrous smelters281 and waivers from the
oxygenated fuels requirements for carbon monoxide nonattainment
areas.282 EPA regulations require notice and opportunity for public
hearing for at least some of these adjustments.283 For some adjustments,
such as the technology-improvement deadline extensions for new sources
using innovative technological systems of emission reduction, the CAA
requires that EPA make its determinations “after notice and opportunity
for public hearing,” but the CAA says nothing else about the form or
content of those proceedings.284
Other adjustments are subject to the procedures that govern the
issuance of permits. For example, hardship-based adjustments from the
limitations on nitrogen oxides emissions promulgated under the acid
deposition control program are issued by “permitting authorit[ies].”285
277. Id. § 268.6(a).
278. Id. § 268.6(j).
279. Id. § 268.44(a).
280. Id. § 268.44(e) (requiring public notice and opportunity for public comment).
281. But the statute does require that EPA conduct a hearing if it determines that the state has
not issued the order in accordance with the requirements of the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(a)(1)(B)
(2000).
282. Id. § 7545(m)(3). That provision authorizes any person to petition EPA for an extension of
the deadline for compliance with these requirements based on the inadequacy of supplies of
oxygenated gasoline, but it does not specify the procedures to be used in responding to such
petitions. Id. § 7545(m)(3)(C).
283. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 57.201(d)(4) (primary nonferrous smelter orders).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(j)(1). For other adjustments under the CAA that require notice and
opportunity for either public hearings or comment, see id. § 7410(f)(1) (petitions for temporary
emergency suspensions of state implementation plan provisions); id. § 7521(b)(4) (waivers from
standards for emissions of oxides of nitrogen from light-duty motor vehicles); id. § 7671(c)(1)–(3),
(d)(6), (e)(1), (g)(1) (various policy conflict-based exemptions from prohibitions on the production
and use of ozone-depleting substances).
285. Id. § 7651f(d); see also id. § 7651g(a) (“The provisions [of the acid deposition control
program] shall be implemented . . . by permits issued to units . . . in accordance with the provisions
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Under the CAA, permitting authorities must notify EPA and other
affected states of permit applications and proposed permits.286 In
addition, EPA will not approve a state permit program under the CAA
unless, among other things, it contains “[a]dequate, streamlined, and
reasonable procedures” for public notice, including an opportunity for
public comment and a hearing.287 A state program also must provide an
opportunity for judicial review in state court “by the applicant, any
person who participated in the public comment process, and any other
person who could obtain judicial review . . . under applicable law.”288
The procedures for CAA permits are similar to those for CWA and
RCRA permits. EPA regulations require that the permitting authority
give public notice of actions such as initial denial of a permit application,
preparation of a draft permit, and scheduling of a hearing.289 The
permitting authority must allow at least thirty days for public
comment.290 During the comment period on a draft permit, any
interested person may submit written comments and request a hearing.291
The permitting authority may hold a public hearing whenever it finds a
significant degree of public interest in a draft permit or whenever a
hearing might clarify one or more issues involved in the permit
decision.292 Any person may submit oral or written statements and data
concerning the draft permit.293 The permitting authority must notify each
person who has submitted written comments or requested notification of

of [the title V permit program].” EPA regulations allow those seeking alternative emission
limitations under this program to “petition the permitting authority,” although the procedures
applicable to such petitions are not spelled out. 40 C.F.R. § 76.10(a)(1). Technology-improvement
alternative emission limitations for sources emitting hazardous air pollutants are also issued by
permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(5)(A), (D); 40 C.F.R. §§ 71.21–71.27. Permits also control technologyimprovement reassignments of sulfur dioxide reduction requirements under the acid deposition
control program and technology-improvement requests for extensions of the deadline for meeting
those requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(b), (c)(1), (d)(1). EPA regulations provide for the issuance
of technology-improvement compliance extensions from national emission standards for hazardous
air pollutants in the course of the Title V CAA permit process. 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.72; 63.77(a), (g).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(a).
287. Id. § 7661a(b)(6).
288. Id.
289. 40 C.F.R. § 71.11(d)(1)(i).
290. Id. § 71.11(d)(2)(i).
291. Id. § 71.11(e). The permitting authority must respond to comments when it issues a final
decision. Id. § 71.11(j)(1).
292. Id. § 71.11(f)(1)–(2).
293. Id. § 71.11(f)(5). A tape recording or written transcript of the hearing must be made
available to the public. Id. § 71.11(f)(6).
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the final permit decision, and the notification must make reference to the
procedures for appeal of a final permit decision.294
ESA.
The ESA provides for informal notice-and-comment
procedures for most of the back-end adjustments it authorizes. The
Interior Department must publish notice in the Federal Register of each
application for an exemption or permit concerning the statute’s taking
prohibition.295 The notice must invite interested persons to make written
submissions relating to the application.296 The Department must make
information it receives as part of an application available to the public at
every stage of the proceeding.297 These procedures apply to technologyimprovement permits and incidental take permits and to hardship-based
and subsistence exemptions from the taking requirement.298 Interior
Department regulations299 require only that the agency publish notice in
the Federal Register of each application for a permit to take endangered
wildlife for scientific purposes or to enhance propagation or survival300
or for an incidental take permit.301 The notice must invite written
submissions by interested parties.302 The same procedures apply to
permits to take based on the prevention of undue economic hardship.303
One back-end ESA adjustment, however, requires a formal hearing.
Federal agencies, states, or permit applicants may seek exemptions from
the ESA’s no jeopardy provision from the Endangered Species
Committee. When the Interior Secretary receives an application for an
exemption, he or she must notify the governor of each affected state and
publish notice of receipt of the application in the Federal Register.304 If
the Secretary determines that the concerned federal agency and the
294. Id. § 71.11(i). The regulations governing acid rain permits are governed by procedures
similar to those applicable to the CAA permit procedures described above. See, e.g., id. § 72.62(d)
(requiring opportunity for public comment and opportunity to request a public hearing on draft
permit); id. § 72.65 (requiring public notice of opportunities for public comment); id. § 72.66(a)
(granting right of any person to submit written comments on draft permit); id. § 72.67 (requiring
opportunity for public hearing); id. § 72.68 (obligating consideration of and response to comments).
295. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (2000).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. The statute makes these procedures applicable to “an exemption or permit which is made
under this section.” Id. The relevant permit and exemption provisions are at id. § 1539(a)(1)(A)–
(B), (b), (e). The statute is silent on the procedures that apply to exemptions from the no jeopardy
prohibition issued by the Secretary of Defense on national security grounds. Id. § 1536(j).
299. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22.
300. Id. § 17.22(a)(1).
301. Id. § 17.22(a)(2).
302. Id. § 17.22.
303. Id. § 17.23. They also apply to applications for permits to take threatened wildlife. Id. §
17.32(b)(1)(ii).
304. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2)(B) (2000); 50 C.F.R. § 451.02(h).

2004]

IMPROVING REGULATION

53

exemption applicant have met certain consultation and assessment
requirements, the Secretary, in consultation with the members of the
Committee, must hold a hearing on the exemption application in
accordance with the APA’s requirements for formal adjudication.305 All
meetings and records resulting from exemption proceedings are open to
the public.306 The Committee must grant an exemption if it determines
“on the record” that the statutory criteria are met.307 That phrase is also
evocative of formal procedures.308
Interior Department regulations provide for the use of formal
adjudication in the development of a report to the Endangered Species
Committee.309 An administrative law judge presides over the required
hearing.310 The regulations require that notice of hearings and prehearing
conferences be published in the Federal Register.311 The parties to the
proceedings include the exemption applicant, the federal agency
responsible for the agency action in question, and any intervenors.312
The administrative law judge must grant leave to intervene if an
intervenor’s participation would contribute to a “fair determination of the
issues,” taking into account whether the intervenor represents a point of
view not already adequately represented.313
The regulations also specify the procedures that govern the
Committee’s deliberations, although the applicable procedures are less
formal and elaborate than those that apply to the Secretary’s
determinations. If the Committee finds that written submissions are
necessary to enable the Committee to make its final determinations, it
must publish in the Federal Register a notice inviting written submissions
from interested persons.314 The Committee must convene a public
hearing if oral presentations are necessary to enable the Committee to
make its final determinations.315 The Committee must publish a notice of
305. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(4), (6).
306. Id. § 1536(g)(8); 50 C.F.R. § 425.05(f). These procedures do not appear to apply to
exemptions from the no jeopardy prohibition issued by the President to prevent the recurrence of
national disasters. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(p).
307. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
308. The APA’s procedures for formal adjudication apply to cases of adjudication “required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
309. 50 C.F.R. § 425.05(a)(1).
310. Id. § 425.05(a)(2).
311. Id. § 425.05(c).
312. Id. § 452.06(a).
313. Id. § 452.06(b)(2).
314. Id. § 453.04(a).
315. Id. § 453.04(b)(1).
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the hearing in the Federal Register.316 The hearing is open to the public
and is “conducted in an informal manner.”317 All information relevant to
the Committee’s decision is admissible.318
2. Rulemaking
Agencies rely on rulemaking to a lesser extent in making back-end
adjustments. Nevertheless, rulemaking procedures are used in RCRA,
the CAA, the ESA, and the OSH Act.
RCRA. In some instances, the government rules on requests for
back-end adjustments such as petitions for delisting regulated chemicals
or endangered species by conducting informal rulemaking proceedings.
EPA must provide notice and opportunity for comment before granting
or denying a petition to delist a hazardous substance under RCRA if it
considers factors that could cause a waste to be a hazardous waste “other
than those for which the waste was listed.”319 EPA’s regulations
authorize any person to file a “petition for a regulatory amendment” to
exclude from RCRA regulation a waste generated at a particular
facility.320 EPA must publish notice of a tentative decision to grant or
deny such a petition in the Federal Register “in the form of an advanced
notice of proposed rulemaking, a proposed rule, or a tentative
determination to deny the petition.”321 Upon the written request of any
interested person, EPA, in its discretion, may “hold an informal public
hearing to consider oral comments on the tentative decision.”322 EPA
must publish its final decision in the Federal Register in the form of a
regulatory amendment or a denial of the petition.323
One other form of back-end adjustment under RCRA is also subject
to informal rulemaking procedures. When Congress ordered EPA to
make adjustments under RCRA for small quantity generators of
hazardous waste, it mandated that EPA do so by promulgating
“standards,”324 which presumably means regulations. EPA has in fact

316. Id. § 453.04(b)(3).
317. Id. § 453.04(b)(4).
318. Id.
319. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(f)(1) (2000). The CAA is silent on the procedures that apply to petitions
to delist hazardous air pollutants. See id. § 7412(b)(3).
320. 40 C.F.R. § 260.22(a).
321. Id. § 260.20(c).
322. Id. § 260.20(d). EPA also may decide on its own motion to hold a hearing. Id.
323. Id. § 260.20(e).
324. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d).
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issued the special provisions for small quantity generators by way of
informal rulemaking.325
CAA. Informal rulemaking also may provide the forum for certain
CAA back-end adjustments.326 The states are free to provide waivers or
variances from their implementation plans. These adjustments may take
the form of revisions to the plan.327 The statute requires that a revision to
the implementation plan be adopted by the state “after reasonable notice
and public hearing.”328 According to Professor Rodgers:
The Clean Air Act extends no right to an adjudicatory hearing, and
most states treat preparation of the plans as inviting legislative-type
decisions where affected parties may appear and present statements but
not participate further through cross-examination and submission of
questions, unless a particular need is shown.329

EPA regulations require that a state conduct at least one public hearing
before adopting and submitting a plan revision to EPA.330 The state must
supply at least thirty days’ notice before holding a hearing.331
ESA. Petitions to list or delist species under the ESA also are subject
to informal rulemaking procedures. The Interior Department, for
example, must publish in the Federal Register its findings as to whether a
listing or delisting petition “presents substantial scientific evidence or
commercial information indicating that the requested action may be
warranted.”332 If the agency makes an affirmative finding, it must
subsequently decide whether the requested action is warranted.333 If not,
the agency must publish that finding in the Federal Register.334 If so, the

325. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Management System, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,174 (Mar. 26, 1986) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260–63, 270–71).
326. The CAA is silent on the procedures that apply to certain adjustments of SIPs, including
temporary emergency suspensions issued by state governors under 42 U.S.C. § 7410(g) to prevent
plant closings. The governor may issue a temporary emergency suspension on the basis of a
national or regional energy emergency “after notice and opportunity for public hearing.” Id. §
7410(f)(1).
327. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.104(d) (stating that, in order for a variance to be considered for approval
as a revision to a state plan, “the State must submit it in accordance with the” procedures applicable
to plan submissions).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l).
329. 1 RODGERS, supra note 66, § 3.9B, at 255–56.
330. 40 C.F.R. § 51.102(a).
331. Id. § 51.102(d).
332. 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(1). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
333. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(1).
334. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(3)(i).
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Department must issue a proposed regulation.335 The ESA specifies that
the APA procedures for informal rulemaking apply to any regulation
promulgated in response to a petition.336 The statute requires that the
Interior Department provide actual notice of proposed listing or delisting
regulations to the state agency in each state in which the species is
believed to occur and invite each such agency to submit comments.337
The agency may give notice to professional scientific organizations338
and must publish a summary of the proposal in a newspaper of general
circulation in each part of the United States in which the species is
believed to occur.339 The ESA requires the Interior Department to hold a
public hearing if any person requests one within forty-five days after
public notification.340
OSH Act. The OSH Act authorizes employers to apply to the
Secretary of Labor “for a rule or order” for a harm-based variance from
an occupational safety and health standard.341 A request for a rule would
presumably be subject to rulemaking proceedings, while OSHA would
consider a request for an order through adjudication.342 The statute
dictates that the Secretary issue the rule or order “if he determines on the
record, after opportunity for an inspection where appropriate and a
hearing, that the proponent of the variance has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conditions” the proponent
proposes will provide places of employment that are as safe as those that
would result from compliance with the standard from which the variance
is sought.343 The APA requires that agencies use formal rulemaking
procedures “[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing.”344 The OSH Act references to a
decision “on the record” and to an opportunity for a hearing trigger this
335. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(3)(ii).
336. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(4). Those procedures are spelled out in the Interior Department’s
regulations. 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c).
337. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii).
338. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(C).
339. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(D).
340. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(E); 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(3).
341. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d).
342. The OSH Act also authorizes employers to apply for “a temporary order granting” a
hardship-based variance. Id. § 655(b)(6)(A). The statute requires notice to employees and an
opportunity for a hearing. Id. Because the statute does not require that the decision be based “on the
record,” informal adjudication would seem to be the proper procedure for consideration of these
hardship-based variances. Nevertheless, OSHA has promulgated regulations that apply the same
formal procedures to § 655(b)(6)(A) and § 655(d) variances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1905.1(a)(1). These
same procedures also apply to back-end adjustments based on national security grounds under 29
U.S.C. § 665. 29 C.F.R. § 1905.1(a)(2) (2003).
343. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d).
344. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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APA requirement.345 Similarly, the OSH Act authorizes the Secretary,
“on the record, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,” to issue “rules
and regulations” that provide reasonable variations and exemptions from
any provisions of the statute if he finds that such action is necessary “to
avoid serious impairment of the national defense.”346
OSHA has issued regulations establishing formal procedures for both
the harm-based and national security adjustments.347 Once OSHA
determines that an application for a variance has been filed with the
agency, it must publish a notice of the filing of the application in the
Federal Register.348 The notice must include an invitation to interested
persons to submit written information concerning the application.349 Any
affected employer, employee, or state agency having jurisdiction over
places of employment covered in the application for the variance or
exemption may request a hearing on the application.350 The agency must
convene a hearing whenever one is requested.351 A hearing officer
vested with powers similar to those specified for administrative law
judges under the APA352 presides over the hearing.353 OSHA’s
regulations detail the availability of discovery354 and the manner in which
hearings will be conducted.355 A party is entitled to present its case by
oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct cross-examination.356 The hearing examiner’s final decision
must “be based upon a consideration of the whole record.”357 If a party
files exceptions to the hearing examiner’s decisions, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor reviews that decision.358 OSHA must publish every
345. Similarly, if the employer applied for an order containing a variance, formal adjudication
would seem to be required. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (“This section applies . . . in every case of
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing.”).
346. 29 U.S.C. § 665.
347. By contrast, informal rulemaking governs the issuance of occupational safety and health
standards, although OSHA’s procedures go beyond the minimum requirements of the APA. 29
C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)(1), (b).
348. 29 C.F.R. § 1905.14(b)(1).
349. Id. § 1905.14(b)(2)(iii).
350. Id. § 1905.15(a).
351. Id. § 1905.20(a).
352. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c).
353. 29 C.F.R. § 1905.22(a).
354. Id. § 1905.25.
355. Id. § 1905.26.
356. Id. § 1905.26(c)(1). Cross-examination is limited to whatever “is required for a full and
true disclosure of the facts.” Id.
357. Id. § 1905.27(b).
358. Id. § 1905.29.
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final action granting a variance or exemption in the Federal Register.359
Only a decision by the Assistant Secretary is regarded as a final agency
action for purposes of judicial review.360
C. Evaluation
Most of the back-end adjustments in the five statutes we have
surveyed are subject to notice and comment adjudicatory procedures,
particularly adjustments issued in the course of decisions on permit
applications. Informal rulemaking involving notice and comment
procedures governs several adjustments, such as those involving requests
for the delisting of chemicals regulated under RCRA or the CAA or of
endangered or threatened species under the ESA. In some instances, an
agency may also hold a legislative-type hearing. Formal adjudication is
confined to requests to the Endangered Species Committee for
exemptions from the ESA’s no jeopardy provision and perhaps to
requests for more lenient restrictions on thermal discharges under the
CWA. Formal rulemaking governs only requests for certain variances
and exemptions from occupational safety and health standards under the
OSH Act. This section analyzes the adequacy of existing procedures to
promote public accountability concerning back-end adjustments.
1. Notice and Comment Procedures
The type of notice and comment procedure that is employed for most
of the back-end adjustments is the same type of procedure that is widely
employed in the administrative process for making decisions about
regulatory policy. Nevertheless, there are reasons why it may not be
adequate in the context of back-end adjustments in light of the resources
available to the public to monitor the back-end process.
a. Advantages
As Roger Cramton pointed out long ago, the potential benefits of
administrative procedure—fairness and accuracy—need to be balanced
against the “efficient disposition of [agency] business.”361 In light of the
tradeoffs involved, a notice and comment process is generally considered
359. Id. § 1905.6.
360. Id. § 1905.51.
361. Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58
VA. L. REV. 585, 592 (1972).
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adequate for promoting the accountability of public policy decisions for
three reasons.
First, the procedures are efficient. Since the agency is not involved
in holding a hearing, it can make its decision relying entirely on the
written input that it receives.
Second, notice and comment procedures are adequate to vet the
issues involved because public policy decisions are normally based on
scientific and policy information.362 The extra time and expense of using
trial-type procedures, such as testimony and cross-examination, is
considered to be unnecessary since these decisions do not involve
specific facts that are within the knowledge of specific individuals.363
Thus, the right to file written comments usually offers an adequate
opportunity to contest scientific or policy information on which an
agency may rely.364
The criteria that Congress has established for making back-end
adjustments appear to involve mostly scientific and policy information.
Harm-based adjustments authorize regulatory relief if a polluter does not
create the same risk to people and the environment that a rule was
designed to address.365 Technology-improvement adjustments authorize
relief if it is likely to produce innovative abatement technologies.366
Fairness-based adjustments involve claims that a firm cannot meet the
abatement goal for reasons (other than cost, in the case of the CWA) not
anticipated by the agency at the time a rule was adopted,367 and policybased adjustments involve balancing environmental and other policy
goals.368
One form of adjustment—the hardship-based adjustment—may
appear to be more on the borderline between scientific and policy facts
and information that is uniquely known to a particular person. This
adjustment is available if a firm can demonstrate that compliance with a
regulation involves a degree of economic hardship not anticipated by the
agency when it adopted a rule.369 Nevertheless, it appears that informal
procedures are adequate to resolve whatever adjudicatory facts might be
362. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3, at
225–79 (3d ed. 1999).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See supra Part III.B.1.
366. See supra Part III.B.3.
367. See supra Part III.B.4.
368. See supra Part III.B.5.
369. See supra Part III.B.2.
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in issue.370 First, the evidence regarding a firm’s economic hardship will
be documentary, and it seems unlikely that testimony and crossexamination will be necessary to assess its accuracy.371 Second, the
firm’s claim of unique hardship can be judged by looking at information
such as industry profitability data, which is publicly available.372
Moreover, to qualify for this adjustment, a firm typically must still
demonstrate its ability to protect people and the environment from some
degree of risk, even if it is granted regulatory relief.373 An agency
assessing whether a firm has made this showing will be analyzing
scientific and policy information.
Third, an agency is subject to judicial review concerning its
adjustment decisions,374 and a court would expect the agency to justify its
decision in light of the comments that it has received.375 This gives
interested parties the opportunity to contest an outcome that they oppose
and requires the agency to rebut any relevant, substantial objections that
were brought to its attention.376 Thus, the public is assured that an
agency has to take seriously the comments that are filed. The agency’s
failure to respond adequately to significant comments will lead a court to
remand a decision back to an agency to address such comments.
b. Disadvantages
Despite the advantages of a notice and comment process, it may not
be sufficient to ensure the proper use of back-end adjustments. A backend adjustment process is subject to three potential problems that may
not be solved by relying on notice and comment procedures.377
370. See PIERCE, supra note 362, at 267 (“not all controversies concerning adjudicative facts
require use of a judicial-type hearing”).
371. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482–83 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(upholding EPA’s determination that a judicial-type hearing was unnecessary regarding a corrective
order in part because there would be little need to establish witness credibility through demeanor
evidence or cross-examination).
372. Id. (upholding EPA’s determination that a judicial-type hearing was unnecessary regarding
a corrective order in part because evidentiary disputes could be resolved on the basis of the written
evidence in the record).
373. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
374. If the mandate that an agency uses to approve an adjustment does not provide for judicial
review, the agency could be sued under the APA, which authorizes judicial review at the behest of
persons “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
375. See, e.g., Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency’s justification
must “explain how the agency resolved any significant problems raised by the comments”).
376. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“agency
[must] set forth with clarity the grounds for its rejection of opposing views”).
377. In addition to the accountability problems addressed below, the back-end adjustment
process may be subject to abuse if adjustments are issued by state agencies in the absence of
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First, Congress has failed to require any procedures for some backend adjustments, leaving it to the agency concerned to determine what
type of procedures to use.378 As a general matter, Congress should
mandate the use of administrative procedures when it authorizes the use
of adjudication to implement back-end adjustments. Otherwise, an
agency is free to have no such procedures or to provide less procedural
protection than is adequate for the decision-making process. EPA has
voluntarily plugged this gap,379 but without a legislative mandate, it
would not have to do so.
Second, without effective public monitoring, an agency may
grant so many exceptions that a rule becomes incoherent,380 or
unacceptable levels of harm to the public health or the environment may
be threatened if regulators fail to consider the cumulative impact of the
adjustments that they are making.381 If environmental and public interest
groups are aware that this is happening, they can point it out to the
agency when they file written comments in an adjustment proceeding.
This pattern of behavior, however, may be difficult to spot due to the
piecemeal nature of the regulatory adjustment process. The groups could
monitor the adjustment process on an ongoing basis to obtain
information about the number and impact of adjustments, but this type of
monitoring may require resources that the groups lack. Moreover, due to
the esoteric nature of regulatory adjustments, it seems unlikely that the
press will serve this watch-dog role.
Third, although notice and comment procedures are considered
to be adequate to promote public accountability in rulemaking, back-end
adjustments may pose a different situation than the promulgation of a
rule. Agencies may make a bad policy decision in both an initial
rulemaking and a back-end adjustment, but it may be easier for interested
sufficient oversight. Many of the back-end adjustments discussed in this Article may be issued only
by EPA, although the statutes sometimes require concurrence by the state. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §
1311(c) (EPA may issue hardship-based adjustments under the CWA); id. § 1311(g) (EPA, with the
concurrence of the state, may issue harm-based adjustments under the CWA); id. § 1311(n) (EPA,
with the concurrence of the state, may issue FDF variances). In other situations, the states may issue
adjustments, but only with EPA’s approval. Under the CAA, for example, variances adopted as SIP
revisions are subject to EPA approval. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(l). Although the subject of state issuance
of back-end adjustments is largely beyond the scope of this Article, we favor vesting the states with
the authority to issue back-end adjustments of the sort discussed in this Article only if a state’s
decisions are subject to EPA oversight.
378. See, e.g., supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 252–80 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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parties to influence the rulemaking process than the adjustment process.
Agencies typically have only a few ongoing rulemakings at any one time,
whereas EPA or other agencies might have many more adjustment
proceedings. In light of the limited resources of environmental and other
public interest groups, they may not be able to participate in dozens of
back-end proceedings that make regulatory adjustments.382 Moreover,
even if they do participate, these groups may lack the scientific and
technical resources to participate effectively in adjustment proceedings to
the extent that such decisions turn on this information.383
Other papers presented in this symposium suggest that the lack of
participation may be a significant problem. David Cozad, an EPA
attorney who participated in this symposium, noted that, in his
experience, there is almost no involvement of public interest groups or
others in adjustment proceedings.384 Professor Rechtschaffen likewise
observed that there was limited or no citizen or interest group
participation in enforcement proceedings.385 If public interest groups or
citizens are unable to participate in enforcement proceedings, this would
suggest that they would be unable to participate in adjustment
proceedings.
Nevertheless, there are also reasons to think that notice and comment
procedures will provide accountability. First, if the policy process is
reoriented as we recommend, there will be a less cumbersome and
elaborate process at the front-end, which should free up resources for
public interest groups to participate at the back-end. Second, even
without this shift, state and local environmental groups could focus their
efforts on the adjustment process.386 The lack of such participation at the
moment may be attributable to the lack of transparency of this process,
which we address in the next section.
2. Hearing Procedures
382. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 2, at 173.
383. Id.
384. David Cozad, [title], 52 KAN. L. REV. ___ (2004).
385. Rechtschaffen, supra note 6, at 32.
386. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory
Boards in Environmental Decision-making, 73 IND. L.J. 903 (1998) (addressing the procedures for
involving the public in environmental decision-making); Zygmunt B. Plater, A Modern Political
Tribalism in Natural Resources Management, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the way
small groups of people living in cohesive affiliation have a narrowed community interest in natural
resource management). See also PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 233–34 (1993) (“Where the national groups are prone to settle their
differences with polluters through compromise, the grass-roots groups usually will settle for nothing
less than complete victory because the health of their children as well as their own and the
habitability of their own homes are on the line.”).
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There is some reason to be concerned that notice and comment
procedures, as currently structured, may not promote the necessary
accountability for back-end adjustments. The question, then, is whether
there are additional procedures that Congress should require that would
address these potential problems. Congress could authorize interested
persons to request a public hearing and require agencies to hold such a
hearing upon some statutory trigger. As our survey indicated, there are
legislative-type hearings for some of the back-end adjustments, and a
formal hearing is required in three instances.
A legislative-type hearing process would give interested parties an
additional opportunity to influence the agency, but environmental and
public interest groups can bring the same information to the attention of
an agency in written comments as they can through testimony, assuming
that the groups have the resources to participate effectively. Indeed,
written advocacy probably would be more effective than speaking orally
for a short period of time. Thus, a legislative-type hearing does not
address the limitations of a notice and comment process in promoting the
rationality of the back-end process. A legislative-type hearing process
would allow citizens who normally would not file comments to appear
before the agency and make their views known, but such presentations
are less likely to present policy information that is influential to an
agency or a reviewing court, although it may indicate something about
the extent and intensity of public support or opposition.
A more formal hearing process is not the answer either. First, as
noted earlier, procedures such as calling witnesses and cross-examination
do not generally illuminate scientific and policy issues.387 Second, even
if additional hearing rights gave interested members of the public a
greater opportunity to build a record against back-end adjustments,
participation in such a hearing is resource-intensive, which is likely to
limit the number of environmental or public interest groups that could
afford to participate, at least if the hearing procedures are frequently
invoked. Finally, expanded hearing rights might be used strategically by
opponents of adjustments, such as competitors of the company
requesting the adjustment. Thus, this solution has the potential to slow
down the approval process in cases where approval is in the public
interest.

387. See supra notes 362–64 and accompanying text.
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D. Greater Transparency
A better way to improve public accountability is to increase the
transparency of the back-end approval process. The idea is to give the
public access to information that allows interested persons to evaluate the
extent to which the potential problems identified earlier might exist.
More specifically, we propose that agencies be required to make all
relevant information about the adjustment process available on the
agency’s web site and that agencies be required to report annually to the
public on their use of back-end adjustments, including information that
bears on the problems that we have identified.
1. Electronic Reading Rooms
Under existing notice and comment procedures, agencies are
required to notify the public, usually in the Federal Register, that they
have received a request for a back-end adjustment,388 but there is no
further requirement that the other documents that comprise the decisionmaking process be readily available to the public. If someone wants to
look at the comments that have been filed or the agency’s justification
for granting or denying an application for an adjustment, he or she would
have to visit the document room the agency maintains either in its
headquarters in Washington or in an appropriate regional office to
request the documents, or would have to locate and communicate with
the appropriate agency employee to request that the documents be sent to
him or her.
These hurdles would disappear if all of the written information
relevant to adjustment proceedings were posted by an agency on its web
site. All regulatory agencies now have web sites and the government has
established one location—www.firstgov.gov—that provides central
access to all agency databases. An electronic reading room for
adjustment documents should be established within this framework.
Congress has already required agencies to make some documents
available on the Internet, but this requirement probably would not force
agencies to establish this type of electronic reading room. The Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) obligates an agency to make available to the
public other records in its files,389 except to the extent that the records fall
within one of the exceptions from disclosure that Congress established.390
388. See supra Part IV.B.1–2.
389. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2000).
390. Id. § 552(b).
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The FOIA, therefore, would require an agency to divulge most, if not all,
adjustment documents if requested by a member of the public.391 The
FOIA further obligates an agency to make available to the public in a
reading room “final opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases”392 and any
other records that “the agency determines have become or are likely to
become the subject of subsequent requests.”393 The Electronic Freedom
of Information Act Amendments of 1996 require federal agencies to
establish electronic reading rooms—i.e., web sites—for information that
the FOIA requires to be made available in reading rooms.394
Nevertheless, agencies are likely to escape from any legal obligation to
establish a web site for adjustment documents on the grounds that they
are not the subject of widespread requests. It is unlikely that
environmental or other public interest groups will be in a position to file
numerous requests for such information, and agencies, therefore, are not
likely to be bombarded with requests for such documents.
Since agencies can avoid establishing electronic reading rooms for
adjustment documents, Congress should require them to establish such
rooms.
Such legislation should also include some of the
recommendations of the American Bar Association about how to make
administrative proceedings more useful to members of the public via
agency web sites.395 Concerning notice and comment rulemaking, the
ABA has recommended that agencies provide “a means for interested
persons to enroll for electronic notification of further developments in a
matter,” post “notices of proposed rulemaking on the agency’s own site,
and provid[e] opportunities for electronic comment there,” and post
“required analyses, public comments, and other constituent elements of a
rulemaking docket on the agency’s web site as far as practicable in
readily searchable form.”396 The same requirements would be useful to
the public in terms of monitoring the notice and comment procedures

391. See PIERCE, supra note 362, at § 8.3.3 (describing the exemptions from disclosure). Some
documents might qualify for protection as trade secrets and confidential commercial information.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
392. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A).
393. Id. § 552(a)(2)(D).
394. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
395. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
PRACTICE, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR LAWYERS DIVISION, RECOMMENDATION (2001)
(outlining
recommendations
on
Federal
Agency
Web
Pages),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/federal02.pdf.
396. Id.
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used in informal adjudications by EPA that determine adjustment
requests.
An electronic reading room for adjustment applications should lower
the cost of participation for interested persons and groups. A party can
sign up for electronic notice that an application has been made and can
monitor whether anyone has filed comments in favor of or in opposition
to an application. If groups have an easier way to monitor the process,
they may be able to determine more easily which applications pose a
threat to people and the environment and file comments in those
proceedings. If this occurs, an agency will be more accountable for its
actions.
An electronic reading room will also permit interested persons to
monitor whether an agency appears to be engaged in granting an
excessive number of applications or whether the agency has taken into
account the cumulative impact of the applications that it has granted.
Since, however, these functions would require someone to engage in
constant monitoring, or at least visit the reading room to see whether
these problems might exist, we also recommend that Congress require
agencies to publish an annual report, which would make monitoring of
these potential problems easier.
2. Annual Reports
Congress should also require an agency to publish an annual report
on its web site concerning its adjustment activities. This report should
include statistics indicating the number of adjustment requests that the
agency received and the disposition of those requests, both in total and in
relationship to the statutory provisions that authorize adjustments. The
report should also organize this information by geographical area so that
readers can determine the number and type of adjustments made under
different statutory provisions in the same location. Finally, Congress
should require the agency to report on how the adjustment process has
served the statutory goals of the statutes under which adjustments have
been granted.
This report should make it easier to identify when an agency may
have granted an excessive number of adjustments or failed to consider
the cumulative impact of its adjustments. If an agency has granted a
large number of adjustments, either in total or concerning a particular
statutory provision, it would alert interested persons to go to the agency’s
electronic reading room and review the available information. The goal
would be to determine whether the adjustments appear to be justified and
whether the agency has granted so many adjustments that the integrity of
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a regulation is threatened. Similarly, the report should make it easier to
identify whether an agency has taken into account the cumulative impact
of the adjustments it has granted. If the agency has granted significant
adjustments in one geographical area, readers could go to the electronic
reading room to see if the agency has taken the cumulative impact of its
adjustments into account when granting the adjustments.
Armed with the previous information, interested parties could take
several steps to attempt to rein in inappropriate use of the adjustment
process. Environmental and other interest groups could use the
information to prioritize their intervention in ongoing adjustment
proceedings. They could focus their efforts on those agencies and those
adjustment proceedings where it appeared that an agency was acting
inappropriately. Thus, despite limited resources, the groups would have
a better chance at heading off misuse or mistaken use of the adjustment
process. The same groups could call the attention of their political allies
in Congress to any misuse of the adjustment process, which may result in
political pressure being brought to bear on the agency. Similarly, they
could call the attention of the media to the misuse of the adjustment
process by an agency, which may result in adverse publicity for the
agency.
Annual reports are not likely to prevent all misuse of the adjustment
process. Environmental groups still may be hamstrung by limited
resources despite prioritizing their intervention in adjustment
proceedings. The media may be uninterested in stories about a
complicated, inside-the-beltway story about the administrative process.
The political allies of environmental and other public interest groups may
lack the clout to rein in misguided or captured agencies. No
administrative process, however, will prevent all misfeasance or
malfeasance by the government. Moreover, the greater degree of
transparency that we propose will expose agencies to significant public
monitoring of their actions, and the amount of oversight and concern will
increase if agencies adopt the back-end adjustment process as an
important method of adjusting regulatory policy.
E. Conclusion
Most back-end adjustments occur using notice and comment
procedures. This approach is efficient, yet it gives the public an
opportunity to present evidence or make arguments to which the courts
expect agencies to respond. A legislative-type hearing or a formal
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hearing would reduce the efficiency of the adjustment process and is
unnecessary to promote rational decision-making.
Notice and comment procedures are effective to hold an agency
accountable for back-end adjustments, provided there is public
participation. The potential weakness of a back-end process is that
environmental and other public interest groups, or individual citizens,
may not participate because of the number of such adjustments and a
lack of resources to participate effectively both on the front end and the
back end of the process. To enhance the ability of interested persons to
oversee agencies’ use of back-end adjustments to make regulatory
policy, we therefore propose that the back-end process be made more
transparent by the use of electronic reading rooms and annual reports.
Greater transparency is not likely to produce public involvement in
every adjustment decision or even in most adjustment decisions.
Universal participation, however, is not necessary to have the back-end
process work effectively. First, many of the adjustment applications are
likely to be routine and non-controversial. Second, although the notice
and comment process is a check on agency decision-making, this does
not mean that agencies will make unreasonable decisions without public
participation. Third, we anticipate that local environmental groups will
focus their advocacy on the adjustment process as it becomes a more
central element in regulatory policy. Finally, these and national
advocates can monitor the back-end situation using the electronic reading
room and annual reports and prioritize their participation based on
agency performance and the significance of the adjustment applications.
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF THE BACK-END
For years, critics of environmental and other forms of regulation
have criticized prevailing methods of regulation as unnecessary,
inefficient, unduly burdensome, or otherwise irrational. Although the
critics’ calls for reform have not convinced Congress to repeal existing
regulatory schemes, Congress has imposed on agencies such as EPA a
series of analytical obligations with which agencies must comply before
they may adopt new regulations. Additional such requirements have
been adopted by executive order. Supporters of these techniques assert
that they will improve the rationality of regulation. Cost-benefit
analysis, for example, is supposed to assure that agencies do not adopt
counterproductive regulations whose economic costs exceed the
environmental, health, or safety benefits that result from regulation.
We have argued in our book on risk regulation, and others have
argued elsewhere, that the effort to improve the rationality of regulation
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at the front end of the regulatory process by heaping on agencies a
plethora of analytical obligations such as the obligation to undertake a
cost-benefit analysis is misguided. As the number of analytical
requirements has mushroomed, it has become more difficult and timeconsuming for agencies to run the gauntlet of applicable analytical
procedures. The strains on agencies have been exacerbated by a scarcity
of agency resources. Front-end analysis therefore creates the risk of less
agency regulation as agencies devote more and more time to each
regulatory project. Moreover, the new analytical requirements do not
necessarily improve regulatory policy. The problem of bounded
rationality makes it difficult, if not impossible, for agencies to provide
accurate and useful information in performing front-end analytical tasks,
such as cost-benefit analysis. If such techniques are incapable of
calculating the optimal level of regulation, then agencies forced to rely
on them may wind up delaying issuance of regulations while they
conduct their analyses with no assurance of improved quality of eventual
regulatory output.
We took the position in our book on risk regulation that a better
approach to improving regulatory policy is for agencies to focus
increased attention on the back end of the regulatory process instead of
seeking to perfect regulation through ad nauseum front-end analysis.
Back-end adjustments can provide a safety net to protect against the risk
of erroneous or incomplete decisions when agencies initially adopt
regulations. The availability of this safety net may make agencies more
comfortable in issuing regulations that have not been analyzed to death.
Agencies are likely to have more accurate information at the back end of
the process than at the front end because back-end analysis typically
takes place when agencies already have had some experience in
administering the applicable regulatory scheme. Back-end adjustments,
therefore, should be less susceptible to the problem of bounded
rationality than front-end analysis.
In this Article, we surveyed five federal statutes designed to protect
the public health, safety, and the environment to determine whether these
statutes provide agencies with the opportunity to make back-end
adjustments. Our survey reveals that these statutes authorize EPA,
OSHA, and the Department of the Interior to issue back-end adjustments
on at least five different grounds, each of which has the potential to
improve regulatory policy in the context of individualized regulatory
applications. Although we have, for the most part, endorsed these backend techniques, we also have suggested some limitations, such as
eliminating the availability of hardship-based adjustments from
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technology-forcing regulations and the adoption of a requirement that the
recipients of some kinds of back-end adjustments demonstrate that the
relief they seek will not subject the public health and safety or the
environment to unacceptable levels of risk.
We recognize that the resort to back-end adjustments creates the risk
of regulatory failure if agencies issue adjustments that, either
individually or cumulatively, allow levels of pollution or other harmcreating activity that are inconsistent with statutory goals. But front-end
analytical requirements also create a risk of regulatory failure. An
agency determined to avoid meaningful regulation, for example, can
skew its cost-benefit analysis by ignoring or deemphasizing the
unquantifiable benefits that a regulation is designed to produce. The
greater the costs appear to be in relation to the resulting regulatory
benefits, the less protective the regulation issued by the agency in
reliance on that cost-benefit analysis is likely to be. Consequently, the
risk of capture or other regulatory failure is not, by itself, a convincing
reason to prefer front-end analysis to back-end adjustments. That risk
may be troublesome, however, if oversight of the agency is less effective
at the back end than at the front end of the regulatory process. There is a
legitimate concern that public interest groups will find it more difficult to
monitor agency decisions at the back end than at the front end because
those decisions will be more numerous, more dispersed, and less visible.
To counter that danger, we recommend that all back-end adjustments
continue to be subject to a notice and comment process. In addition, we
support the adoption of requirements that are designed to improve the
transparency of the decision-making process, including the establishment
of electronic reading rooms and the submission of annual reports on
back-end activity. These steps will allow agencies to rely on back-end
adjustments to improve regulatory policy while minimizing the risk of
abuse through the issuance of excessive or unwarranted back-end
adjustments.
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